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Preface
This book began as a history of the Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide
Reactor (SEFOR). Our research led us to additional goals—to inform
the public generally about the risks attending a national commitment
to utilize fast nuclear reactors for electric power generation, and perhaps
most importantly to us in the end, to consider carefully the risks of a
worst-case accident that were taken during the experiments conducted
in the SEFOR 20 megawatt (thermal) plutonium-fueled fast-neutron
reactor during the period 1969–71 in the rural Ozark Mountains of
Arkansas. The book is dedicated to:
Richard E. Webb, 1939–
and
David Okrent, 1922–2012
Whom we consider pioneers in fast-reactor safety engineering.
Drs. Webb and Okrent, practicing nuclear engineers with extensive experience in fast-reactor safety research and development, were
deeply involved in the debates regarding fast-reactor safety during the
period 1960–80 when major commitments to a liquid metal fast breeder
reactor (LMFBR) based electric power production program were highpriority goals for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). We
considered the AEC’s response to Webb’s and Okrent’s officially documented advice regarding the risks of accidental explosions in fast reactors that could fail the containment structures provided. It appears,
as the United States considers proposals to initiate a fast-reactor-based
program for electric power production as a means of dealing with the
climate change threat, that there are critically important lessons here in
catastrophic risk management as well as in government.
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Prologue
“If something seems too good to be true, it probably is.”

During the 1960s, there arose a promise of electric power production
so cheap that it might not even have to be metered. And it arose as
the result of the United States entering the nuclear age via the atomic
bomb destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the ultimate swordsto-plowshares project, it was theorized that it is possible to design a
nuclear reactor that actually produces more nuclear fuel than it consumes in the process of generating heat to boil water to provide steam
to drive large generators of electricity. Ignoring the problem of residual
radioactive waste generated by the operation of any nuclear reactor,
this proposed reactor would have to be a “fast” reactor in order to actually produce more fuel than used. The fuel produced by these “breeder
reactors” would be plutonium. A number of individuals raised concerns
about the advisability of developing fast reactors in general, the concern
being the safety of such reactors. But nuclear physics had predicted a
self-regulation mechanism inherent in such reactors called the Doppler
effect that could possibly remove concerns about safety.
At this time in American history, the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) was in control of the nuclear programs in the United States. The
AEC was unique in that it not only regulated nuclear activities, it also
promoted those activities, and it had a desire to experimentally test the
effectiveness of the Doppler effect in an effort to promote breeder reactor development. One would suppose a national laboratory would be
charged by the federal government with designing such an experiment.
However, this was not the case. A consortium of energy-producing
industries and foreign governments called the Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR) Consortium officially initiated the
construction of a 20-megawatt reactor to test the Doppler effect, and
that reactor would be sited within twenty miles south and west of
ix
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Fayetteville, Arkansas, the home of the University of Arkansas. The
AEC provided the nuclear fuel for this reactor. That fuel was plutonium, and the amount was sufficient to build some one hundred atomic
bombs of the size of those used on Japan if one desired to do so. The
actual design and operation of the reactor and the actual experimental
procedures were accomplished by General Electric.
The experiments were simple: have the reactor operating in a manner capable of generating enough heat to generate up to 20 megawatts
of thermal power; then remove the control mechanism that maintained
that level of operation and see if the Doppler effect would actually slow
the now out-of-control reactor. General Electric did an excellent job of
designing the reactor and process as the reactor was brought back under
control in a series of experiments, each exceeding the previous as to the
level of “out-of-control” that occurred. In the last test, conducted with
the reactor operating at 8 megawatts power, the amount of heat produced rose to nearly 10,000 megawatts, an increase by a factor of more
than a thousand, before the reactor was brought back under control.
As this book shows, this SEFOR experiment was hailed by the
nuclear industry as one of several demonstrations that fast reactors
could be controlled. The project was terminated at the end of that
month (December 1971), and the site closed in early 1972. In 1975,
the SEFOR Consortium donated the SEFOR site to the University of
Arkansas.
The question this book explores is: just exactly what did SEFOR
prove? Since there was no runaway nuclear reaction, the experiment
was a success, but just how controlled was the actual experiment? To
further raise questions, remember that the fuel was plutonium, which
causes radiation poisoning and persists for thousands of years. Also
consider the amount present in the small SEFOR reactor. And finally,
consider that fast reactors require a more concentrated form of nuclear
fuel (approaching weapons grade) than the less concentrated fuels in
today’s nuclear reactors used for electric power generation.
In the global warming concerns of today, one again hears that
nuclear should be pushed to the forefront, and breeder reactors are the
way to go. This book provides details of exactly what SEFOR accomplished and why those in positions of authority should very carefully
consider exactly what we know about the safety of fast reactors.
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The authors were faculty at the University of Arkansas for a combined total of more than eighty years of service. Both were actively
involved in the process of obtaining the data on the creation and function of SEFOR in preparation for seeking federal funding in totally
dismantling the site. Our first approach to federal funding was rebuffed
because the federal government claimed no function in the creation of
SEFOR. Thanks to many years of Arkansas legislators working for this
goal, federal funding was finally obtained, and the site is now a greenfield available for general use.
It is of interest to note that the AEC was abolished in 1974 due to
congressional concerns about its ability to regulate nuclear activities.
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Introduction

There is an understandable drive on the part of men of good will
to build up the positive aspects of nuclear energy simply because the
negative aspects are so distressing.
Alvin M. Weinberg, 1915–2006

Until late 2018, the remains of the SEFOR reactor rested in a 114.5-feethigh, 50-feet-diameter, steel cylinder intended as a final barrier to prevent catastrophic release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere if
the reactor inside were ever breached by explosion. The top half of the
rusting containment vessel protruded from a hayfield in the rural Ozark
Mountains nineteen miles south-southwest of Fayetteville, Arkansas,
the home of the University of Arkansas.
SEFOR’s construction was completed in the late 1960s, and the
research reactor was operated by the General Electric Company for the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for about three years. The authors,
now retired professors at the university, were involved in one way or
another with the reactor site for most of our careers. Our involvement
enabled our access to the reactor’s history; we believe that history is
unique in the development of the nuclear power generation industry.
SEFOR was closed in early 1972 following a multiyear reactorsafety research program. The idle reactor site was deeded in 1975 to
the university by the Southwest Atomic Energy Associates (SAEA), a
consortium of electric power utility companies in the area. The SAEA’s
promotional literature implied that completion of a large array of fastbreeder reactors “burning” plutonium fuel would ensure production
of electric power almost “too cheap to meter” and described SEFOR
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as “the most significant single reactor-safety experiment in the western
world.” In recognition of the importance of the reactor-safety research
completed at the site, the American Nuclear Society in 1986 designated
SEFOR a Nuclear Historic Landmark. In the Mechanical Engineering
Building at the university, which earlier housed its nuclear engineering
program, a plaque read:
SEFOR
Resolved a key LMFBR safety issue by demonstrating the
inherent negative prompt-Doppler power coefficient in mixed
plutonium-uranium oxide fuel.
As this book went to press, forty-eight years after the reactor was
closed and placed in temporary “SAFSTOR” condition, the University of Arkansas had received congressional authorization, backed by
funding of approximately $28 million, to complete a decommissioning
process that would return the site to “greenfield” condition. By late July
2019, the reactor vessel had been removed from its containment, placed
in a special protective vessel, and trucked to a Nevada disposal site.
But already by the time SEFOR commenced operation a potentially serious nuclear explosion risk had been identified, and it appears
now that the principal purpose for SEFOR was to demonstrate evidence
of a theoretically predicted safety factor that could provide an answer
for that concern. Up to this time (around 1960), commercial nuclear
electric-power reactors, operating with fissile fuel concentrations of
less than about 3%, had been accepted as having an inherent safety
characteristic—there appeared to be no way the position of the fuel
could be rearranged by accident that could cause a nuclear-bomb-like
explosion. SEFOR, in contrast, required nearly a tenfold enrichment of
its plutonium fuel, and such enrichment had been predicted to enable
fission reaction rates that could result in nuclear explosions powerful
enough to destroy the reactor-containment systems. Dealing with this
potentially dire safety problem remains today a critically contentious
proposition.
Almost half a century later, there are renewed calls for a fast-
neutron fission reactor program for electric power generation; proponents claiming that fast-neutron reactors are the best solution
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available to meet the country’s electric power energy needs while simultaneously reducing carbon dioxide additions (from burning fossil fuels)
to the atmosphere. However, this book shows that very serious additional
concerns remain about the hazards attending operation of fast-fission
nuclear reactors, even now when we are not confident of our ability to
“engineer” our current aging fleet of water-cooled (thermal) nuclear
power reactors to provide satisfactory safety to the public in the event
of “highly unlikely” events such as are history now (several times over).
We believe this book presents a convincing argument that the
SEFOR sodium-cooled-enriched-plutonium reactor was an important
step in the development of reactors driven by fast neutrons capable
of reaching, in accident conditions, fission rates approaching nuclear
bomb capability. While the nuclear explosions that became possible
in such reactors would be extremely “inefficient” compared to a welldesigned bomb, their potential to catastrophically rupture any containment structure that could be economically provided could be so high as
to be deemed completely unacceptable. Indeed, we do not take lightly
our belief that such an explosion as could rupture its containment structure and release a large fraction of plutonium into the environment is
a very real example of the “dirty (radioactive) bomb” fear that worries
authorities so seriously.
SEFOR successfully demonstrated the inherent (Doppler) safety
effect in a fast reactor using enriched plutonium-oxide fuel. The reactor site was closed in early 1972, and the AEC stepped up research and
development programs to support building a large fleet (roughly a thousand were planned) of liquid-metal-cooled, plutonium-oxide-fueled,
fast-breeder reactors (LMFBRs) to meet the energy needs of the country
projected for the year 2000. But those plans received much less attention following the landmark decision in 1983 to abandon the Clinch
River (Tennessee) Breeder Reactor (CRBR) Demonstration Plant. The
reasons for the CRBR’s cancellation continue to be debated, but there
is little doubt that the cancellation resulted at least partly from two
developments: a less pessimistic outlook for fissile uranium availability
and remaining questions of public safety associated with the heightened
nuclear explosion risk. It seemed clear that the uncertainties in cost of
ensuring public safety by building fast-reactor containment structures

4 | Thin Safety Margin

sufficiently strong to confidently prevent catastrophic accidental releases
of radioactive materials to the environment importantly worsened the
economic outlook.
SEFOR was closed during the period when the LMFBR program
had achieved highest priority with the AEC. But the sufficiency of the
SEFOR-demonstrated Doppler effect to ensure prevention of runaway
nuclear explosions in fast reactors was still being questioned by experts.
The importance of such questions had been highlighted by accidents
resulting in a partial meltdown in the EBR-I fast-breeder experimental
reactor in 1955 and a partial meltdown/explosion in the SL-1 fast reactor in 1961, both at the AEC’s National Reactor Test Station in Idaho,
and in the partial meltdown in 1966 of the FERMI-1 fast-breeder demonstration reactor constructed by Detroit Edison on Lake Erie about
twenty miles from Detroit. The accidents at SL-1 and FERMI-1 have
been described for the lay reader in the books Idaho Falls 1 and We
Almost Lost Detroit,2 respectively
Today, despite claims that SEFOR provided a “positive” answer to
the nuclear-explosion-critical-safety question, it appears that the possibility of an uncontrolled nuclear explosion that could fail any containment that could be practicably and economically provided still exists.
At the same time, many experts contend that the consequences of even
a very weak nuclear explosion in a large fast reactor sufficiently powerful
to vaporize and release a substantial fraction of its fissile fuel along with
the radioactive components of the spent fuel to the atmosphere would
be so severe as to be deemed a completely unacceptable risk.
Much has been written about the AEC’s structuring of the nation’s
nuclear weapons program and its connection with the nuclear power
industry. Our interest was sharply piqued in such matters following the
transfer of ownership of the SEFOR site to the University of Arkansas
in 1975. By that time, SEFOR was becoming viewed as a potentially
hazardous nuclear/chemical waste site, and the university learned that
the federal government was not disposed to accept any responsibility
for the government-required cleanup operations that were mandated.
Then our research on the history of the SEFOR project produced,
in Appendix G of Thomas Cochran’s The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder
Reactor: An Environmental and Economic Critique,3 excerpts from testimony in 1972 of Dr. Richard E. Webb before the Joint Committee on
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Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress4 regarding the explosion potential of fast reactors. Dr. Webb received his PhD in nuclear engineering from Ohio State University in 1972 with his dissertation entitled
“Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Transients in Liquid Metal Cooled Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs).”5
Dr. Webb testified (in part) that “With one-half ton of Plutonium
in the SEFOR reactor, it appears that the AEC simply took a chance
with the public safety by purposely causing power excursions, which
one tries normally to prevent in power reactors, to test a safety effect
(Doppler feedback) that was not beforehand demonstrated in a fastreactor power excursion.”
This book focuses on Dr. Webb’s documented statements about
SEFOR along with other material that he submitted to the AEC on the
subject of “runaway” nuclear explosion risks attending the operation
of fast reactors. We have also relied on Dr. Webb’s book The Accident
Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants,6 published by the University of Massachusetts Press in 1976. It appears that the AEC failed to give serious
consideration to Dr. Webb’s science-based advice to Congress’s Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy on the explosion potential attending
operation of fast-breeder reactors.
Our research revealed the international significance of the safety
experiments conducted quietly in the rural Ozark Mountains of northwest Arkansas. The SEFOR research project resulted from international
agreements, backed by financial assistance, among the United States,
Germany, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg. A series of difficulties
beset the project due to U.S. laws that prohibited the authorization of
atomic projects in the United States that could be controlled or dominated by a foreign power, and the details of resolution of such disputes
clearly indicated the power that could be brought to bear to ensure
continuation of the SEFOR project. SEFOR was highly important to
the AEC and the representatives of government organizations then promoting nuclear power in Europe, particularly Germany.
The AEC was abolished in 1974. The United States’ Clinch River
Breeder Reactor (CRBR) was canceled, uncompleted, in 1983. Germany’s
SNR-300 breeder reactor (Germany’s demonstration breeder reactor)
was completed and fueled for operation in 1985. Never operated, the
SNR-300 was officially canceled in 1991. Both the CRBR and the
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SNR-300 received approvals for construction that were likely justified
in part by the successful completion of the SEFOR program.
The strident debates ongoing today worldwide regarding our stewardship of the planet, the threats of numerous “tipping points” being
reached in that stewardship, and a tendency for economic interests to
trump science-based recommendations for managing such stewardship
suggest that the United States faces problems of our own making that
exceed any we have faced previously. These problems, ranging from
global warming concerns to ineffective management of the catastrophic
risks of intentional or accidental explosions of nuclear weapons and
the effectively out-of-control nuclear waste products that have resulted
(for which there appear to be few if any effective management options
in sight), are of such magnitude that a much more effective manner
of addressing them is required; otherwise we face extremely severe
consequences.
In consideration of industry claims for greater safety of the proposed new fast-reactor fleet, this book was planned to provide a history
of the remarkable decision in the 1960s to site a fast-neutron reactor
fueled with nearly a half-ton of plutonium in the rural Ozark Mountains for the stated purpose of demonstrating a theoretically predicted
“inherent safety” feature that would prevent a potentially containmentfailing nuclear explosion in the reactor resulting from accident or natural disaster. Despite their acknowledged importance, it appears that the
results of the SEFOR experiments did not then, and do not now, carry
the message of guaranteed safety that the public was left to believe.
There is still no consensus among scientific experts regarding the potential for a nuclear explosion in a fast-neutron reactor that could overcome
the containment systems designed to prevent a catastrophic release of
radioactive materials to the environment; but there is no doubt that
even a very “inefficient” one could be disastrous.
The information becoming available about the Fukushima multiplereactor meltdowns, the releases of radioactivity that occurred, and the
fearsome potential for even more catastrophic releases to occur from the
terribly damaged plants in Chernobyl and Fukushima are sobering. But
while many scientists and engineers remain concerned that the threat of
future disasters involving the aging thermal (slow) neutron fleet is very
real and growing, it is becoming clear that adoption of a fast-neutron
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reactor power program, which portends risks of nuclear explosions that
are largely obviated in thermal reactors, is a step that must not be taken
before subjection to rigorous and transparent science-based evaluation. Society’s reliance on a new class of fast-neutron reactors requires
the most careful and sober consideration of the risks of catastrophic
releases of highly radioactive materials—no degree of wishful thinking
is acceptable.
The Department of Energy’s predecessor, the AEC, was a principal
driver in siting and operating SEFOR, providing more than half a ton
of plutonium fuel for the SEFOR experiments. That much plutonium,
sufficient in quantity for more than a hundred nuclear fission weapons
with nominal 15 to 20 kiloton explosive yields (Hiroshima/Nagasaki),
had never been placed in a reactor anywhere in the free world, much
less on public land in a rural setting with nil security. As the risks to the
public attending the use of that much plutonium in a reactor so sited
would appear now to be so controversial as to be completely unacceptable, a history of SEFOR that describes the uncertainties accepted and
the risks taken fifty years ago is timely.
The five-decades-old tale of the SEFOR reactor “inherent safety
experiment,” now almost forgotten by the local population as well
as the twenty-eight-thousand-plus University of Arkansas student
body, contains a prescient warning. The rapidity with which we have
advanced our understanding of nature in the past century has accelerated dramatically since SEFOR was closed. There is great danger that
such exponential growth in scientific information has surpassed the
ability of the public to be able to understand it meaningfully enough
to participate in our democratic governmental process. There are now
many ways that we can destroy ourselves and our world if we continue
to ignore the limits to which nature can be pushed sustainably. The
principal purpose of this book came down to an attempt to simplify
the known scientific information about the SEFOR experiments and
fast-reactor hazards that should be understood by the public. The clear
coupling between nuclear power and global warming/climate change,
both scientific issues challenging the limits to which the public has
information at hand to participate effectively in the governmental
decision process, provides compelling reasons to pause for careful
evaluation.
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Note to Readers
A primary goal of this book began as an appeal to three very different groups of
people to think critically about a major risk to which they are considering a commitment. That commitment is the adoption of fast nuclear reactor technology
for generating electric power—buttressed with the argument that the “nuclear”
approach is the best means of addressing the climate change threat of increasing
carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. The groups of people are (a) experts,
(b) students, and (c) the general public. We suspect it’s unlikely that those professing expertise in fast-neutron nuclear electric power generation as well as climate change will all be convinced by the arguments presented, but we are hopeful of their careful consideration. While the public, if only due to their number,
will ultimately decide these questions if democratic choices prevail, a special
obligation was felt to address the university student population. It appears that
students of all ages have insufficient knowledge to decide such issues on their
own, or perhaps more importantly, to meaningfully influence the general public in that regard. We received a barrage of warnings that we had little chance
of reaching all three such disparate groups—the concern was that some of the
material presented was simply too technical for all but those expert in nuclear
science. We have tried to present a reasonably clear picture of the risks attending
the use of fast-neutron reactors for electric power generation with a minimum of
nuclear science theory. Where this was simply not practical, we have collected
the required “technical” material largely in chapter 5. For those mathematically
less inclined and hoping primarily to equip themselves with important information to help decide the issue of risk attending fast-neutron fission generation
of electrical power, the heavy sledding involved in chapter 5, although critically
important to the expert community, is not absolutely required. But please, if
you do skip chapter 5, do not miss the facts presented therein for the record by
Dr. Richard Webb to the AEC regarding the risks taken in the SEFOR experiments. We believe Webb’s admonitions to the AEC about the risks associated
with LMFBR operations were never nearly sufficiently considered. We hope
that the information presented here, some of which is not easy to obtain from
the popular literature, has been reduced to a level simple and straightforward
enough to be appreciated by all three groups and that all will find it useful.

Notes
1. William McKeown Idaho Falls: The Untold Story of America’s First Nuclear
Accident, ECW Press, 2003.
2. John G. Fuller, We Almost Lost Detroit, Reader’s Digest Press, 1975.
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3. Thomas B. Cochran, The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor: An Environmental
and Economic Critique, Resources for the Future, distributed by Johns Hopkins Press.
4. “Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Demonstration Plant,” Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress, 92 Congress
(Sept. 7, 8, 12, 1972), pp, 179–187.
5. Richard E. Webb, “Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Transients in Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs)”
(PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971).
6. Richard E. Webb, The Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, University
of Massachusetts Press, 1976.
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2

SEFOR Site, Strickler, Arkansas,
December 1971

After almost two years of preparatory experiments, the General Electric Company was confident that the theory underlying the reactor’s
design was correct and the experiments beginning in December would
demonstrate that SEFOR, fueled with plutonium oxide instead of pure
metallic plutonium used in some fast reactors (and in atomic bombs),
would respond to a planned /intentional upset (reactivity increase) condition with a sufficient time lag that would allow the reactor’s energy
output to be slowed and stopped without suffering an explosion that
could endanger the reactor’s containment structure.
The demonstration of the “inherent Doppler safety” effect in a fast
plutonium-oxide-fuel reactor that was super-prompt-critical (chainfission-reacting at nuclear bomb rates) was the principal purpose of
SEFOR’s construction and operation. The company’s reactor designers
appear to have planned carefully. In addition to their confidence that
the Doppler-theory-predicted time lag would be observed, the experiment was designed so that even if the anticipated (Doppler) time lag
were not of the magnitude anticipated by theory predictions, the potential for the reaction to heat the fuel sufficiently to melt in amounts
sufficient to cause severe explosion damage was not thought to be there
anyway, obviating an explosion that could not be contained.
It was extremely important to be sure that no detail had been
overlooked. The reactor fuel comprised approximately 900 pounds
of plutonium, a quantity sufficient in purified form to build approximately one hundred atomic bombs each with the explosive power of
the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ending World War II.
More importantly to Arkansas and the adjacent states of Oklahoma,
Kansas, and Missouri, if it were possible for an explosion to vaporize a
substantial amount of the plutonium in the reactor, and that plutonium
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escaped the containment into the atmosphere in the form of an aerosol,
the surroundings extending to distances of many miles could be catastrophically affected, even forcibly abandoned.
Six experiments were completed during the coming week; in each
succeeding experiment, an increased amount of positive reactivity was
introduced into the reactor’s core. The amount of reactivity inserted
increased from amounts sufficient to produce sub-prompt criticality to,
and slightly beyond. the amount that enabled super-prompt-criticality,
the condition required to achieve reaction speeds with nuclear bomb
explosion potential.
The experiments appear to have been planned to introduce in
each successive experiment an additional amount of reactivity that was
sufficiently small to be canceled by the predicted Doppler effect, thus
preventing the melting temperature of the plutonium-oxide fuel from
being reached.
The ramp reactivity insertion in each of the six experiments was
intentionally short-lived, intended to be limited to 0.1-second duration.
Following the reactivity insertion, each experiment was terminated
with a time-delayed negative-reactivity insertion (reactor SCRAM)
initiated approximately 0.35 seconds after the transient reactivity insertion. The SCRAM delay time following the reactivity insertion was
planned to allow time for the demonstration of the Doppler effect to
cause the extremely rapidly rising reactor power rate to be halted and
proceed downward to a level where the reactor could be SCRAMMED.
The entire “business” of each of the six final experiments of the
program, including the super-prompt-critical experiments, was thus
completed in less than one second. In the last test, No. 6, the reactor
was steady at about 8 million watts (thermal power) when the reactivity
insertion was made. During the 0.1-second-duration reactivity insertion, the reactor power rose to almost 10 billion watts (more than a
thousand-fold increase) before descending rapidly to about 200 million
watts by the time the SCRAM (chain reaction stoppage) was actuated.
If, in Test No. 6, the increase in SEFOR’s power level caused by the
positive reactivity insertion had not hesitated as predicted by the Doppler effect; if the reactivity insertion had been accidentally maintained
longer than the planned 0.1-second duration; and if the SCRAM procedure had accidentally failed—there was the real possibility that the
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power level might have increased to levels with the potential to rupture
the containment. If that were to occur, there was the potential for some
considerable fraction of the 900 pounds of plutonium to be released in
aerosol form into the atmosphere.
There was no explosion, and the data obtained from the six experiments that week in December 1971 were considered a demonstration
that the Doppler effect could provide an important safety margin for
fast-breeder reactors using plutonium-oxide fuel. Within a month,
the reactor was closed and placed in SAFSTOR condition (partially
decommissioned).
In the concluding chapters, this book considers the “What if” questions posed two paragraphs above. We believe the book provides evidence that the Doppler effect demonstrated by the reactor’s plutoniumoxide fuel might have been overridden by autocatalytic effects following
fuel melting if the accidental events postulated above occurred in combination during the prompt-critical transient tests concluding with Test
No. 6 in December 1971.
We provide documented evidence in chapter 6 that SEFOR suffered a partial SCRAM failure during an experiment in 1970. That
SCRAM system failure probably did not seriously endanger the reactor,
due to the smaller amount of positive reactivity that had been inserted
into the reactor core in that experiment.
We believe that the SEFOR test program provides reasons to seriously consider what might have happened if an identical partial SCRAM
(as occurred in 1970) had occurred in any of the prompt-critical transient tests that concluded with Test No. 6 in December 1971.

chapter

3

Nuclear Fission Bombs
and Reactors

Nuclear Energy
In the molecules of substances the atoms are held together by electric
forces, and the potential energy stored by these forces is known as
chemical energy . . . it can be helpful to imagine that an atom consists
of a very compact kernel, called the nucleus, which is surrounded by
shells of electrons. The nucleus contains particles called neutrons,
which are not electrified, and others called protons which carry positive electricity. Neutrons and protons are roughly equal in weight
and are nearly 2000 times heavier than electrons. The whole atom is
tiny; so tiny than an ordinary person can hardly imagine that it has
any size at all. A sheet of paper is about a million atoms thick. The
nucleus is very much smaller: it would take about 100,000 nuclei
to stretch across one atom. . . . The forces between the protons and
neutrons inside an atomic nucleus are millions of times stronger than
those between the atoms in a molecule. And so the potential energy
due to nuclear forces is very much greater than that due to chemical
forces. When one pound of carbon burns it produces 14,500 BTU of
heat energy, but its nuclear energy is 39 million million BTU. This
vast store of energy in a pound of carbon corresponds to about ten
thousand million KWH of electrical energy, which is roughly equal to
the entire output of a very large power station in a year.
F. J. M. Laver, 19621
Nuclear Bombs
The object of the project is to produce a practical military weapon in the
form of a bomb in which the energy is released by a fast neutron chain
reaction in one or more of the materials known to show nuclear fission.
Robert Serber, 19432
15
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Thermal (Slowed) Neutron Fission Reactor
Average Neutron Speed ~2,000 meters/second (~4,500 miles/hour)
Fast Neutron Fission Reactor
Average Neutron Speed ~20 million meters/second (~45 million miles/
hour)

A Nuclear Fission Primer
The principal purpose of the SEFOR experiments was to provide
data that would demonstrate a theory-predicted nuclear reaction effect
that could be important for a fast-neutron reactor’s safe control and
shutdown—even under accident conditions. SEFOR did demonstrate the inherent capacity of its plutonium-oxide fuel arrangement to
decrease, due to the Doppler effect, the severity of a potential runaway
nuclear power excursion (explosion). However, it does not appear to
have been the end-all answer to the nuclear explosion hazard that was
implied in the public announcements of the experiments.
A satisfactory answer to the question of whether an accidental
nuclear explosion could occur in a fast-neutron fission reactor that could
release enough energy to fail the containment depends on two primary
factors: the explosion magnitude that is possible, and the explosion
magnitude required to fail the containment. To consider the question of
the explosion magnitude that is possible, either at an experimental reactor similar to SEFOR or in a larger commercial fast reactor that might
be proposed for electric utility service, we must provide the reader with
an understanding of certain nuclear reaction facts.

Atoms
The idea that all forms of matter are different arrangements of point-like
particles separated by space was proposed centuries ago by the Greeks,
but evidence for such an understanding of the nature of things only
gained scientific acceptance about a hundred years ago. Most important
to the arguments in this book, we now know that all mass, whether gas,
liquid, or solid form, is composed of such “particles.” All such particles,
which the Greeks called “atoms” (meaning indivisible), are extremely
small, very sparsely separated in space, and in constant motion.
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Einstein provided the scientific argument for the existence of atoms
in 1905 by explaining the rapid motion of plant-pollen particles suspended in water and observed with a microscope in 1827 by Robert
Brown. Einstein showed that the motion of the suspended (pollen) particles, called Brownian motion, was the result of extremely large numbers of collisions of (atomic) “particles” of liquid water with the much
larger suspended pollen particles. We now know that the “particles” of
water were actually molecules—each consisting of two hydrogen atoms
combined with one oxygen atom.
Structure of Atoms
By about 1900 (consider how recently!), we had learned that all matter is
composed of approximately 100 different atoms, called the “elements,”
displayed to all chemistry students in the periodic table. And we soon
learned that all of the elements are different combinations of just three
“elementary” particles:
• Electrons—negatively charged particles with a mass of 9.11 × 10−31 kg,
discovered in 1897
• Protons—positively charged particles with a mass of 1.675 × 10−27 kg,
discovered in 1920
• Neutrons—neutrally charged particles with a mass of 1.673 × 10−27 kg,
discovered in 1932
Atoms are differentiated by the number of protons they contain.
The number of electrons is normally equal to the number of protons,
so that the atom is neutrally charged; the balance of
the atom’s mass is comprised of neutrons. This mental picture of the atom is referred to as the planetary
model; although now considered to be unrealistic, it
will aid our “visualization.” We know that the size of
the nucleus, which is a very densely compacted collection of protons and neutrons at the center, is an extremely small fraction of the size of the atom (picture a “cloud” of electrons with an outer
boundary defining the size of the atom). The diameter of the nucleus
(of any atom) is about 100,000 times smaller than the atom’s diameter.
Consequently, any atom is mostly space. We turn our attention now to
nuclear explosions.
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Explosion in (or of) a material is defined as the disassembly (flying apart) of the material that results from very rapid expansion due to
increase in temperature (heating) and pressure. Chemical reaction explosions are the result of rearrangement of the electrons of the atoms. The
nuclei of atoms are not affected in such reactions. This picture is simplified, but it aids us in focusing on reactions that result in changes in the
nucleus, specifically the nuclear fission chain reaction. The discovery of
this type of reaction started the world down the path of investigating
the potential for making “super” bombs with thousands of times the
damage potential of bombs based on chemical reactions. A parallel path
of investigation soon appeared in which the goal was to control the rate
of nuclear fission reactions to allow the potential release rates of energy
to be harnessed for “peaceful” purposes, such as to generate electricity.
So began the eventual path to SEFOR.

Nuclear Fission
The nuclear fission reaction was discovered in the laboratory in late
1938 in Germany by Hahn and Strassmann. They were studying uranium to understand what happened if neutrons collided with uranium
nuclei. The experimental results indicated that some of the nuclei of
uranium atoms were somehow splitting (later called fissioning) and
forming two new elements that Hahn and Strassmann identified as
barium and krypton. This contradicted their expectation that the striking of the uranium atoms by neutrons would either result in the absorption of the neutron or “chip off” small parts of the atoms, changing the
makeup of the uranium only slightly. Instead, they were observing the
uranium atoms to be splitting into roughly equal parts! Before the year
1939 ended, scientists around the world agreed that the reaction Hahn
and Strassmann had observed was explained by the following formula:
1 uranium atom + 1 neutron = 1 barium atom + 1 krypton atom
+ 2 neutrons
It was soon learned that the atoms formed in a uranium fission
event would not always be the same; many other pairs of elements
than barium and krypton can result. In fact, a large number of fission
products are produced, many of which are dangerously radioactive. We
know that production by a bomb of such radioactive products results
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in a severe hazard to life that unavoidably accompanies the destructive
blast and heat effects of the bomb. We know as well that nuclear reactors produce copious amounts of highly radioactive products as the fuel
fissions. The primary hazard considered in this book is the potential
for a relatively minor (compared to a bomb) nuclear explosion in a fast
reactor that could completely fail the containment and release large
amounts of radioactive aerosolized fission products and fuel components (principally uranium and/or plutonium) into the environment.
Scientists soon realized that the combined masses of the fissionproduct atoms formed is slightly less than the mass of the “parent”
uranium atom, and the “missing” mass is converted to energy via Einstein’s famous equation, E = mc2. This knowledge continues to haunt the
world. The nuclear fission reaction results in the conversion of this “lost
mass” to kinetic energy (speed) of the products of the reaction—the fission products and the neutrons. The realization quickly followed that
if a uranium nucleus were fissioned by a single neutron, and the fission
reaction produced two (or more) new neutrons, a “chain reaction” could
occur with an exponentially increasing rate (doubling the reaction rate
at each step). The time step for the doubling would be related directly
to the speed of the neutrons producing the chain r eaction—the faster
the neutrons, the shorter the doubling time (the faster the reaction
rate), and the more powerful the explosion. SEFOR was a fast-neutron
reactor.
The idea of a fast-neutron fission chain reaction is not complicated.
Assume that each fission generates exactly two neutrons, each of which
can cause a subsequent fission that generates two more neutrons. The
number of neutrons produced at each chain reaction step then increases
as two raised to the step number N, or 2N. Scientists quickly realized
that a chain reaction completing eighty such nuclear reaction steps could
occur in less than 1 microsecond (1 millionth of a second) and could liberate (explosion) energy equivalent to approximately 20,000 tons of TNT
(trinitrotoluene, a chemical explosive). The number of neutrons formed
in eighty such steps can be calculated with your iPhone: 21 = 2 22 = 4
23 = 8 24 = 16 … 280 = 1,208,925,819,614,600,000,000,000.
Eighty such steps of nuclear chain reaction would require fissioning of only about 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) of uranium, or a sphere
with diameter about 3 inches (baseball size). The largest bomb in the

20 | Thin Safety Margin

arsenals of any nation at that time, their size limited usually by the carrying capacity of the largest military aircraft available, had an explosive
yield equivalent to about 6.5 tons (more than 3,000 times smaller) of
TNT. The race was on to build an atomic bomb.
It has been almost three-quarters of a century since that race began.
In many ways, the race to develop controlled nuclear reactors for “peaceful” purposes began at the same time. But those seventy-five years seem
in the dim past to the students who are studying at the University of
Arkansas today; most of them were born fifty years after the discovery
of fission and twenty years after SEFOR had closed. Although most of
the students today have “heard of ” nuclear reactions, they appear for
the most part ignorant of the scientific knowledge required to decide
whom to believe on questions as basic as how to maintain the nuclear
weapons arsenal in “safe” condition or how to “safely” utilize nuclear
power reactors to generate electricity. Both of these questions are at the
top of the list in importance to our society today. To begin meaningful consideration of the relevance and importance of the results of the
SEFOR experiments, we require an understanding of the basic science
differentiating nuclear fission reaction rates that occur in bombs and in
nuclear power reactors.

Nuclear Fission Bombs
To provide a brief introduction to the physics of nuclear fission bombs
we defer to Robert Serber’s The Los Alamos Primer.3 The primer contains
the lecture notes prepared for presentation to the Manhattan Project scientific staff assembled at Los Alamos with the mission to build a nuclear
fission bomb that could be delivered to its target by military aircraft.
The lecture notes, later published as The Los Alamos Primer, were written
in April 1943 and classified top secret until released to the public in 1965.
In twenty-one succinct parenthetical statements, the primer spells
out what we need to know about fission bombs to begin our consideration of the relevance of the SEFOR experiments to the question of the
nuclear explosion potential attending operation of fast-neutron reactors. The following numbered statements are direct (partial) quotes
excerpted from the primer. As some of the statements of the primer
are not required for our purposes, and as our goal here is to reduce
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the information presented to the minimum required to quantify the
potential for explosive energy release in fast reactors, we have emphasized selected statements, some of which are abbreviated. The quotations presented below (with brief explanatory remarks following) are
the most important for our purposes. The titles of the remaining statements are included so that the heading numbers correspond directly to
the twenty-one numbered statements in the primer.

1. The Object
The object of the project is to produce a practical military
weapon in the form of a bomb in which the energy is released
by a fast neutron chain reaction in one or more of the materials
known to show nuclear fission.
The focus is on the fissile (capable of being fissioned) materials U235
(uranium isotope 235) and Pu239 (plutonium isotope 239). The scientists at Los Alamos in the spring of 1943 anticipated that realization of
a practical bomb would require fast-neutron reactions. SEFOR was a
fast-neutron reactor fueled with plutonium.

2. Energy of Fission Process
The direct energy release in the fission process is of the order
of 170 million electron-volts (MEV) per atom. This is considerably more than 107 times the heat of reaction per atom in
ordinary combustion (chemical burning) processes. . . . 1 kg of
25 (fished) is equivalent to about 20,000 tons of TNT.
The physicists at Los Alamos had code expressions for key words
and phrases: “fissioned” became “fished,” 25 stands for U235, 28 for
U238, and 49 for Pu 239. 107 is ten million. The final sentence changed
forever the prospects of military conflict; nuclear fission weapons would
be thousands of times more powerful on a weight-for-weight basis than
chemical-based bombs.
Release of this energy in a large-scale way is a possibility
because of the fact that in each fission process, which requires
a neutron to produce it, two neutrons are released. Consider
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a very great mass of active material, so great that no neutrons
are lost through the surface, and assume the material so pure
that no neutrons are lost in other ways than by fission. One
neutron released in the mass would become 2 after the first
fission, each of these would produce 2 after they each had
produced fission so in the nth generation of neutrons there
would be 2n neutrons available. Since in 1 kg of 25 there are
5*1025 nuclei, it would require about n = 80 generations to fish
the whole kilogram.
The original primer notes gave the number of nuclei in 1 kg of U235
as 5*1025. Serber changed this number when the primer was published
to the correct value—2.58*1024. 2.58*1024 (2,580,000,000,000,000,000,
000,000) is 2.58 million million million million, a number so large as
to be difficult to provide meaningful illustration. This point is key to
our discussion; the rapid fissioning of 1 kg of U235, which is 2.58*1024
atoms, would cause an explosion with an energy release equivalent to
about 20,000 tons of TNT. It follows directly that if the fissioning
process is limited to smaller fractions of 1 kg, the energy release would
be proportionally smaller:
Fraction of 1 kg fissioned, %
100
10
1
.1
.01
.0025 (1/4 of 1/100 of 1%)

Energy release, tons TNT
20,000
2,000
200
20
2
0.5 (1,000 pounds TNT)

The estimated maximum nuclear explosion that could be economically/practically contained for a commercial-size (electric) fast-breeder
reactor at the time the Clinch River Demonstration Plant was being
considered was equivalent to about 1,000 pounds of TNT. It follows
that a fast-neutron fission chain reaction of U235 of ¼ of 1/100 of 1% of
1 kilogram of U235 (0.025 grams) would release approximately the same
amount of energy as the maximum explosion energy yield that could
be realistically (economically) contained.
While this is going on the energy release is making the material very hot, developing great pressure and hence tending to
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cause an explosion. In an actual finite setup, some neutrons are
lost by diffusion out through the surface. There will be therefore a certain size of say a sphere for which the surface losses
of neutrons are just sufficient to stop the chain reaction. This
radius depends on the density. As the reaction proceeds the
material tends to expand, increasing the required size faster
than the actual size increases. The whole question of whether
an effective explosion is made depends on whether the reaction is
stopped by this tendency before an appreciable fraction of the active
material has fished. (emphasis added)
We have previously defined explosion as the disassembly of the material that results from very rapid expansion due to increase in temperature
and pressure. The rapid release of energy (as heat) of the fission chain
reaction causes the temperature and pressure to rise rapidly (measured in
millionths of a second). The material expands correspondingly rapidly,
but precise prediction of the rate of expansion is difficult and uncertain. As the material expands, the density decreases (more space between
atoms), and the number of neutrons escaping through the expanding
surface increases. If the loss of neutrons by escape through the surface
grows too large, the nuclear fission reaction stops. So, an effective explosion requires (1) assembly of a fissile material in an amount sufficient to
sustain a chain reaction and (2) holding it together for a period sufficient
to cause the desired number of fission chain reaction steps to occur (here
illustrated as eighty) before the expansion shuts down the process.
Note that the energy released per fission is large compared to
the total binding energy of the electrons in any atom. In consequence, even if but ½% of the available energy is released . . .
the temperature is raised to the order of 40*106 degrees. . . .
Expansion of a few centimeters will stop the reaction, so the
whole reaction must occur in about 5*10-8 sec, otherwise the
material will have blown out enough to stop it. Now the speed
of a 1 MEV neutron is about 1.4*109 cm/sec and the mean free
path between fissions is about 13 cm so the mean time between
fissions is about 10-8sec. (emphasis added)
If only one-half of 1% of the energy is released, the temperature of the material rises to about 40 million degrees (centigrade), a
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temperature more than sufficient to turn any material known to gas.
The speed of a 1 MEV neutron is about 1.4 billion cm/s (14 million
m/s) or about 4.7% of the speed of light. These neutron speeds, coupled
with the distance traveled between fissions, indicates a measure of the
average time between fissions. It is about 1/100th of a microsecond, or
1/100 millionth of a second. Neutron speeds of this magnitude are also
possible in fast reactors, whereas neutron speeds are about a thousand
times slower in thermal (moderated) reactors. This is another key point.
Since only the last few generations will release enough energy
to produce much expansion, it is just possible for the reactions
to occur to an interesting extent before it is stopped by the
spreading of the active material.
Crucial points are coming fast now. The material must be held
together (continually squeezed) for a sufficiently long period (extremely
small fraction of a second) for the chain reaction to release sufficient
energy to cause the desired damaging effect of the bomb. Serber’s
phrase “interesting extent” refers to the expected damage potential
(20,000 tons TNT equivalent). Holding the material together long
enough to get the desired energy release was a major challenge facing
the bomb designers. This point is also relevant to fast-reactor explosion
hazards, because even though the balance between the rate of energy
liberation (by fission) and the “shutting down” of that energy release
by expansion is expected to result in much less explosion damage than
could occur in a nuclear weapon, the question becomes one of whether
the amount of energy yield that would be possible during credible accident conditions could exceed the explosion confinement capability. As we
mentioned, we will see that economic limits are reached for confinement of about 1,000 pounds TNT equivalent yield. Thus, even a very
inefficient explosion yield (from as little as 1/400 of 1% of 1 kilogram, or
0.025 gram) of fissile material could exceed the economic limit for containment construction.

3. Fission Cross Section
The materials in question are U235, U238, and Pu239 and some
others of lesser interest. Ordinary uranium as it occurs in
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nature contains about 1/140 of 25, the rest being 28 except for a
very small amount of 24. . . . We see that 25 has a cross-section
of about 2.5*10-24 cm2 for neutron energies exceeding 0.5 MEV
and rises to much higher values at low neutron energies. For
28, however, a threshold energy of 1 MEV occurs below which
the cross-section is effectively zero. Above the threshold the
cross section of 28 is fairly constant and equal to 0.7*10-24cm2.
Serber is focusing on the uranium isotopes—we will return to plutonium later. The cross sections can be thought of as measures of the size
of the nucleus of a fissile atom, and the size as a measure of the probability that a collision will occur between that nucleus and a neutron
passing through the atom (mostly space)—the “bigger” the nucleus of
the fissile atom, the more probable that a collision resulting in fission
will occur. It was learned soon after fission was discovered that the cross
section of U235 (a measure of the probability of collision with a neutron) is approximately 2.5*10-24 cm2 for neutrons with energies above
0.5 MEV (speed approximately 7 million m/s), but it increases greatly
at slower neutron speeds. However, the cross section of U238, which
comprises about 99.3% of natural uranium, is about 0.7*10-24 cm2 for
high neutron speeds and is effectively zero for low neutron speeds. The
result is that significant amounts of energy release by chain reaction of
U235 in (natural) uranium fuel (0.7% U235 and 99.3% U238) can only
occur if the neutrons produced by fission are slowed to speeds of about
2000–4000 m/s (so-called thermal neutrons). At such neutron speeds,
very little fissioning of U238 occurs. This is a critical point in our discussion. This fact provides the basis for the oft-repeated statement that
“nuclear reactors cannot explode like a nuclear bomb.” Reactors fueled
with natural uranium cannot be made to provide fission reaction rates
suitable for electrical power generation unless the neutrons produced by
fission (and continuing the chain reaction) are slowed to the so-called
thermal level. The italicized statement does not apply to reactors that have
significantly enriched fissile content, like SEFOR.

4. Neutron Spectrum
In Fig. 2 (not included) is shown the energy distribution of
the neutrons released in the fission process. The mean energy
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is about 2 MEV, but an appreciable fraction of the neutrons
released have less than 1 MEV energy and so are unable to
produce fission in 28.
The important point here is that neutrons with energy less than 1
MEV produce very few fissions of U238, but slow neutrons, on the other
hand, readily fission U235 (and very importantly, we will see that slow
neutrons even more readily fission Pu239).

5. Neutron Number
The average number of neutrons produced per fission is
denoted by ν. It is not known whether ν has the same value for
fission processes in different materials, induced by fast or slow
neutrons or occurring spontaneously. The best value at present
is ν = 2.2+/–0.2 although a value ν = 3 has been reported for
spontaneous fission.
More is now known about the neutron number for uranium and
plutonium. It is greater than 2 for both, and it is greater for plutonium
than uranium. Our use of a value of 2 for purposes of estimating fission reaction rates is too low, but will serve our purposes of illustration
here.

6. Neutron Capture
When neutrons are in uranium they are also caused to disappear by another process represented by the equation 28 + n =
29 + X. The resulting element 29 undergoes two successive beta
transformations into elements 39 and 49. The occurrence of this
process in 28 acts to consume neutrons and works against the
possibility of a fast neutron fission chain reaction in material
containing 28. It is this series of reactions, occurring in a slow
neutron fission pile, which is the basis of a project for large scale
production of element 49.
Another critical point. Plutonium (element 49) is formed in nuclear
reactors by this reaction. Plutonium can be made most expeditiously
in fast-neutron reactors—under some circumstances sufficiently fast
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to produce more fissionable (plutonium) fuel than was used from the
beginning of the reaction. Such a process, called “breeding,” became a
primary goal of the reactor designer, since it would allow the uranium
238 isotope to be converted to plutonium, thus offering the possibility
of extending available energy of uranium found in the earth by perhaps
a factor of a thousand, stretching the available fissionable fuel supplies
from a few decades to several centuries.

7. Why Ordinary U Is Safe
Ordinary U (meaning as-mined), containing only 1/140 of 25,
is safe against a fast neutron chain because, (a) only 3/4 of the
neutrons from a fission have energies above the threshold of 28,
(b) only ¼ of the neutrons escape being slowed below 1 MEV,
the 28 threshold before they make a fission. So the effective
neutron multiplication number in 28 is ν = ¾ x + ¼ x + 2.2
= 0.4. Evidently a value greater than 1 is needed for a chain
reaction. Hence a contribution of at least 0.6 is needed from
the fissionability of the 25 constituent. One can estimate that
the fraction of 25 must be increased at least 10-fold to make an
explosive reaction possible.
This paragraph further explains the “impossibility” of a reactor fueled with natural uranium (1/140 isotope 235, the balance 238)
exploding like a bomb. The last sentence is particularly important to
us; it states that the fraction of the 235 isotope in (uranium) fuel must
be increased at least tenfold to make a violent explosive reaction possible. We will see that fast reactors fueled with uranium or plutonium
are typically enriched to about 20% fissile material, whereas a tenfold
enrichment of natural uranium would give a fissile concentration of
about only about 7%. The result is that the fuel enrichment required in
fast reactors decidedly changes the safety picture; fuel enriched to the 20%
level definitely has the potential for a violent nuclear explosive reaction.

8. Material 49
As mentioned above, this material is prepared from the neutron
capture reaction in 28. So far only microgram quantities have
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been produced, so bulk physical properties of this element are
not known. Also its ν value has not been measured. Its cross
section has been measured and found to be about twice that
of 25 over the whole energy range. It is strongly alpha-radioactive with a half-life of about 20,000 years. Since there is every
reason to expect its ν to be close to that for U and since it is
fissionable with slow neutrons, it is expected to be suitable for
our problem and another project is going forward with plans
to produce it for us in kilogram quantities. Further study of all
its properties has an important place in our program as rapidly
as suitable quantities become available.
We can update this statement for the plutonium isotope 239 (Material 49). In addition to the knowledge that the cross section (reflecting
the probability of fission of a given plutonium nucleus by a neutron) is
about twice as great as U235 over the entire neutron energy (speed) range,
the currently accepted value of ν is closer to 3, indicating a faster exponential chain reaction rate. We will return later to the subject of radioactivity when we attempt to understand the potential consequences of
fast-neutron reactor accidents that could breach the containment and
release the highly radioactive fission products produced by operation
of the reactor as well as the highly radioactive plutonium remaining in
the reactor to the environment. We note here that plutonium is widely
considered one of the most toxic materials known. Serber stated that
the half-life of Pu239 is about 20,000 years. Today the accepted value is
known to be closer to 25,000 years.

9. Simplest Estimate of Minimum Size of Bomb
We will skip most of the technical details of this section, as it is not
necessary for us to follow the important arguments presented here.
We focus on the determination of the minimum size that would allow
neutrons to “leak” through the surface sufficiently rapidly that the
initial concentration of neutrons would die out rather than build up
(stopping the chain reaction). Serber gives two estimates of the minimum size, assuming the bomb material to be pure U235 in the form of
a sphere. This size (measured as its diameter) is called the critical size,
and its amount of material (mass) is the critical mass. The two estimates
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given were 9 and 13.5 centimeters, with corresponding masses of about
60 kilograms and 200 kilograms. Today, unclassified data on the critical mass of a U235 sphere suggests values slightly smaller than Serber’s
estimate of 60 kilograms. These values assume no reflection of neutrons
back into the fissionable material after they exit the surface. It would be
expected that if the fissile material were surrounded by a material that
would reflect neutrons escaping the surface back into the material, the
critical mass (and radius) would be reduced.

10. Effect of Tamper
If we surround the core of active material by a shell of inactive material, the shell will reflect some neutrons which would
otherwise escape. Therefore a smaller quantity of active material will be enough to give rise to an explosion. The surrounding
case is called a tamper.
More current values for critical mass (in kg), with spherical geometry, for weapons-grade fissile materials are:
Pu239
		
U235
Bare
56
11
Thick Uranium Tamper
15
5
The bottom line is that a “tampered” sphere of essentially pure
Pu 239 weighing about 5 kg (about 11 pounds), of which about 20%
(~1 kg) fissioned, delivered about 20,000 tons TNT equivalent explosive
power at Nagasaki in 1945. The bomb’s plutonium sphere was about the
size of a baseball. The amount that fissioned was approximately the size
of a golf ball, and the amount of mass that was converted to energy by
Einstein’s equation, E = mc2, was approximately 1 gram (1 pound mass
is 454 grams).

11. Damage
Several kinds of damage will be caused by the bomb. A very
large number of neutrons is released in the explosion. One
can estimate a radius of about 1,000 yards around the site
of explosion as the size of the region in which the neutron
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concentration is great enough to produce severe pathological
effects. Enough radioactive material is produced that the total
activity will be of the order of 106 curies even after 10 days. Just
what effect this will have in rendering the locality uninhabitable depends greatly on very uncertain factors about the way
in which this dispersion by the explosion occurs. However,
the total amount of radioactivity produced, as well as the
total number of neutrons, is evidently proportional just to the
number of fission processes, or to the total energy release. The
mechanical explosion damage is caused by the blast or shock
wave. . . . If destructive action may be regarded as measured by
the maximum pressure amplitude, it follows that the radius of
destructive action produced by an explosion varies as the cube
root of the Energy (yield). Now in a ½ ton bomb, containing
½ ton of TNT, the destructive radius is of the order of 150 feet.
Hence in a bomb equivalent to 100 kilotons of TNT, one
would expect a destructive radius of the order of . . . about
2 miles.
We know now that the damage produced by a nuclear fission
bomb is of three kinds: blast, thermal (heat), and radiation. The plutonium “test” device exploded at the Trinity site (essentially identical
to the bomb dropped on Nagasaki) was mounted on a steel tower and
exploded at a height of about 100 feet above ground level. The division of the total yield for such kiloton-range weapons among the three
categories is, approximately, blast 50%, thermal (heat) 35%, and radiation 15%. While nuclear fission weapons were principally designed to
deliver damaging blast effects, the thermal energy released is of such
magnitude as to cause extreme temperatures—sufficient to vaporize
most materials near the explosion (the steel tower at the Trinity site was
vaporized) and cause severe burns to unprotected persons at considerable distances as well as starting fires that under certain conditions can
reach firestorm proportions. The radiation hazards of nuclear weapons,
both primary effects of the bomb and secondary effects of the large
amounts of radioactive materials released into the environment, have
assumed much more importance as we have learned more about the
overall effects of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Fission Bombs and Reactors | 31

12. Efficiency
As remarked in Sec. 3, the material tends to blow apart as
the reaction proceeds, and this tends to stop the reaction. In
general, then, the reaction will not go to completion in an
actual gadget. The fraction of energy released relative to that
which would be released if all active material were transformed
is called the efficiency.
“Gadget” was the scientists’ code for bomb. “Transformed” here
means fissioned. We will see that this definition of “efficiency” of
nuclear explosive energy release can be usefully extended to the fissile
contents of a fast (enriched fuel) nuclear reactor. Consideration, then, of
the possibility that some fraction of the active (fissile) material in the reactor
can be fissioned under conceivable circumstances, including accidents and
natural disasters, with sufficient energy release to fail the reactor containment becomes the question that brought us here.

13. Effect of Tamper on Efficiency
For a given mass of active material, tamper always increases
efficiency. It acts both to reflect neutrons back into the active
material and by its inertia to slow the expansion, thus giving
opportunity for the reaction to proceed farther before it is
stopped by the expansion.
The quantitative determination of tamper effect is complicated, but
all we need to take away here is that if the fuel in a fast reactor were to
suffer a reactivity excursion, the reactivity might be further increased
in severity by the tamper effect of the masses of material surrounding
the fuel. We can see that this is an important, but uncertain, part of the
puzzle of quantifying the expected explosion severity in a fast-reactor
accident.

14. Detonation
Before firing, the active material must be disposed in such a
way that the effective neutron number is less than unity. The
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act of firing consists in producing a rearrangement such that
after the rearrangement the neutron number is greater than
unity. This problem is complicated by the fact that, as we
have seen, we need to deal with a total mass of active material considerably greater than the critical in order to get appreciable efficiency.
This paragraph restates the basic requirement for achieving, and
maintaining for a sufficient time, an exponentially increasing fission
chain reaction. First a mass must be assembled that is configured
(arranged) in such a way that is subcritical. The bomb dropped on
Hiroshima accomplished this by assembling the (potentially critical)
U235 in two (separated) sections. The bomb was detonated by rapidly
combining the two masses; this was accomplished via the “shooting”
method in which the two masses, separated in a tube (gun barrel),
were rapidly combined by explosively driving one of the masses into the
other. Simultaneously, the bomb released a strong source of neutrons at
the center of the critical mass that initiated the bomb chain reaction.
If during the assembly of the critical mass there are reaction-initiating
neutrons present, a reaction can begin, termed a fizzle, that will not be
exponentially increasing to produce the desired energy yield. This was
a potential problem for the early bomb designers when plutonium was
used as the fissile material because of the effectively higher reaction rates
that controlled the fission rate of the plutonium. The reaction rates were
too high to allow combination of the two masses of the fuel with the
“shooting method”; the combination of the separate masses by shooting
was just too slow. Consequently, the plutonium bomb utilized a sphere
of plutonium that was subcritical. The fissile mass was “rearranged”
by squeezing it using powerful explosives that spherically crushed the
bomb material, increasing its density beyond the point of criticality, at
which time neutrons were introduced that initiated the chain reaction
fission process.
The fast-reactor safety problem we are considering is quite different. In thermal reactors (without enriched fuel), although there can be
present many times the amount of fissile material in the reactor required
for criticality, it is separated into noncritical masses in the reactor so
that there is no way, as long as the configuration is maintained, that a
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reaction can be initiated that will have bomb-like efficiency. However,
the potential for a much weaker nuclear explosion in a reactor with
enriched fuel is very real. The question is whether the strength of the
explosion that might be possible under any conceivable circumstances
would be sufficient to fail the containment. We are again back to the
question that brought us here.

15. Probability of Detonation (not included)
16. Fizzles
The question now arises: what if by bad luck or because the
neutron background is very high, the bomb goes off when the
neutron number is very close to zero? It is important to know
whether the enemy will have an opportunity to inspect the
remains and recover the material. We shall see that this is not a
worry; in any event the bomb will generate enough energy to
completely destroy itself.
A “fizzle” describes the situation where “firing” of the bomb does
not result in a sustained exponentially increasing rate of fission chain
reaction. The designers worried that the fraction of the fissile material
that fissioned could be so small as to obviate its bomb-utility. However,
an important point arises here in our consideration of the explosion
potential in fast reactors containing enriched fuel. Serber says there
is no “worry” that the fizzled weapon could be inspected (giving up
the secrets of its design), because even a very small, fractionally efficient bomb would still be powerful enough to completely destroy the
weapon. We have already noted that an explosion yield of 1/100 of 1%
of a 20-kiloton bomb like that dropped on Nagasaki would be equivalent to about 4,000 pounds of TNT. The published literature shows
that the maximum planned explosive containments provided for any
of the fast reactors considered by the United States was less than half
that amount.

17. Detonating Source (not included)
18. Neutron Background (not included)
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19. Shooting (not included)
20. Autocatalytic Methods
The term “autocatalytic method” is being used to describe any
arrangement in which the motions of material produced by
the reaction will act, at least for a time, to increase the neutron
number rather than to decrease it. Evidently, if arrangements
having this property can be developed, they would be very
valuable, especially if the tendency toward increasing the
neutron number was possessed to any marked degree.
Both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs utilized autocatalytic
methods. The shooting method assembles the two subcritical masses
sufficiently rapidly that the material is held together for a sufficient
time for the energy release to meet the bomb design requirements. The
“implosion” method used in the Trinity test device and in the Nagasaki bomb squeezed the bomb core to a fraction of its original volume,
and held it there for a sufficient time with chemical explosives aided by
the tamper effect. The result was similarly successful for both bomb
designs; criticality was reached when the density of the material (mass
of bomb material divided by its volume) reached a degree of fission
efficiency required to provide the desired explosive yield before the neutrons escaped through the bomb core surface sufficiently fast to shut the
reaction down. We will see that autocatalytic processes can result in fast
reactors in accidents or as the result of natural disasters. We return to
the question that brought us here. The subject of autocatalytic processes
will be further considered in chapter 5.

21. Conclusion
From the preceding outline we see that the immediate experimental program is largely concerned with measuring the
neutron properties of various materials, and with the ordnance
problem. It is also necessary to start new studies on techniques
for direct experimental determination of critical size and time
scale, working with large but sub-critical amounts of active
material.
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Serber’s conclusions are a short list of the needs then considered
to be of high priority for producing a fission bomb. Not surprisingly, these needs were similar to the needs of those people who were
already working on the methods for designing fission reactors using
the same materials, uranium and plutonium, to generate electrical
power.

The First Plutonium Atomic Bomb
The first plutonium atomic bomb ever tested, rigged as a device named
“The Gadget” and mounted on a steel tower approximately 100 feet
above the ground, was demonstrated successfully in the Trinity test in
New Mexico, July 16, 1945. The bomb design was based on the mathematical prediction of a nuclear fission chain reaction initiated in the
center of a sphere of plutonium. Mathematical (computer) predictions
indicated that if the chain reaction proceeded through about eighty fission generations, an explosive-energy release (yield) of about 20 kilotons
(TNT equivalent) would be achieved. This prediction of the explosion
yield of a spherical-shaped plutonium mass led the designers to shape
the fissile material (plutonium) as a sphere with a hollow central core
into which the neutrons could be released to initiate the fission process.
The sphere of plutonium was sufficiently large that it could be made
“supercritical” by compression (decreasing its volume) using a chemical explosive blanket surrounding the sphere to direct explosive power
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Left: Trinity Test Device,“The Gadget.” Right: Schematic of the Gadget.
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uniformly on the surface of the sphere and directed (focused) at the
center. A “blanket” of explosives symmetrically surrounding the fissile
material (the “bomb core”) was designed to squeeze the sphere to a
sufficiently smaller volume that would make the resulting mass supercritical. Then, at exactly the right instant, a cache of neutrons would
be released at the center of the sphere. All of this “supercritical assembly” of the fissile material (plutonium sphere) had to be accomplished
in a total time, starting with the detonation of the explosive blanket,
of the order of 1 millionth of a second. Perhaps most importantly, the
“rearrangement” of the plutonium molecules was designed to cause a
perfectly symmetrical decrease in the diameter of the spherical shape
during the “squeezing” process. This required an extraordinary capability for controlling the timing and direction of the chemical-explosive
blanket detonation wave directed symmetrically inward toward the
core center. In the end (mid-year, 1945), after a sufficient amount of
plutonium was finally available, requiring nearly two years in the most
expensive scientific/industrial undertaking ever attempted at the time,
the design and demonstration of the bomb hinged on the ability of the
designers to effect the squeezing of a plutonium sphere, maintaining
its spherical shape, to a supercritical volume in around a millionth of a
second and then release at that instant the neutrons at the bomb core
center. If that could be accomplished, the bomb would do the rest. We
know the result; within a few days, a device (dressed as a bomb) that is
thought (the actual design is still classified) to be essentially identical
to the Trinity device, was detonated about 1,600 feet over the aiming
point in Nagasaki, Japan.
The burdens of uncertainty undertaken by the bomb designers
were, although daunting, limited to barely manageable proportions
by designing a process in which a carefully assembled amount of plutonium could be, under controlled conditions, made “critical” at an
appointed instant when the nuclear reaction would be triggered by
the release of fast neutrons at the center of the core and the nuclear
explosion would take its course. The predictions required by the scientists to design a bomb in which such an exacting process would
occur on demand, lasting on the order of a millionth of a second,
required an extraordinarily expensive effort by the best scientists in
the world.
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Relevance of the “Gadget” Design to Explosion Potential
in Fast Reactors
The process of constructing the first nuclear (plutonium) fission
bomb with nominal 20-kiloton TNT equivalent explosion damage
potential, anticipated in Serber’s primer, follows relatively simple
directions:
• Obtain a sufficient quantity of pure fissile material, approximately
5 kilograms of Pu239. In order for this quantity to be safely handled,
it must be separated into at least two parts with distance between the
parts sufficient to prevent the volume of the material from becoming
arranged compactly (by any means, including accidents) enough to
reach super-criticality—the condition where the rate at which new
neutrons are being produced in the material just exceeds the rate at
which neutrons disappear by absorption (by other bomb materials)
or by leakage through the fissile material’s surface.
• To effect an explosion, the separated parts (the molecules less densely
spaced than required for criticality) of the plutonium must be assembled so as to very rapidly increase the overall density sufficiently to
make the material exceed the criticality condition. This is normally
accomplished in a plutonium bomb by (extremely rapidly) compressing a single subcritical mass to decrease the volume sufficiently for
the mass to become supercritical.
• Just after the instant of assembly, release a collection of fast neutrons
at the center of the critical mass, while preventing (to the extent practicable) the expansion of the volume of the material by the extreme
heating process that ensues. It is not possible to completely prevent
such expansion, but the expansion can be delayed to cause the number of fissions required to produce the design yield of the bomb
before the expansion process stops the fission-energy release.
Extreme precision is required for the arrangement of the various
parts of the device. In an implosion bomb, which we focus on, the
compression and explosion development must be spherically symmetric.
To produce such a precisely controlled nuclear reaction process required
precision of construction and design that was unheard of in the mid1940s. Extreme precision is also required in the timing of the bomb
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detonation processes. The duration of these processes is of the order
of a small fraction of a microsecond (1 millionth of a second). In a
properly operating bomb, the processes are so rapid that there is virtually no possibility of controlling the process in order to slow or stop it
(save the certain expansion of the fuel and fission products as a result of
extremely high temperatures).
A nuclear fission bomb is designed to effect a nuclear chain reaction in a collection of fissile material that grows exponentially (in time),
releasing a very large amount of energy in an extremely short time
period (fraction of a microsecond). The fissile material is “assembled”
as a “supercritical” mass, and then a cache of neutrons is released in the
interior of the mass. The mass must be “held together” long enough
(fraction of a microsecond) for the fast chain reaction process to cause
the desired fission energy release (say eighty fission generations that
would release approximately 20,000 tons TNT equivalent energy). The
desired result is the same as for any bomb—the release of such a large
amount of energy in a small volume generates extreme temperatures
(measured in millions of degrees in a nuclear bomb), and such temperatures transform the materials of the bomb to gas that expands,
producing extreme pressures causing “disassembly” of the atoms of the
fuel (as well as surrounding materials). Disassembly is another word for
explosion. There are other damaging effects (such as radioactivity), but
here we focus on the effects that occur in the surroundings as a result
of the absorption (by the bomb materials) of the heat liberated in the
chain reaction and the damaging pressures that are produced.
In contrast, a nuclear fission reactor for producing electric power
is designed to effect a tightly controlled nuclear chain reaction in a
collection of fissile material at a constant rate that can be converted to
electric power. A typical 1,000-megawatt (one thousand million watts)
power station must generate about 3,000 megawatts of heat at a steady
rate to convert (roughly) one-third of that energy (power = energy per
unit time) to produce 1,000 megawatts of electricity. The nuclear fission
reactor in the plant produces the heat energy at a controlled rate and
transfers that heat to the reactor coolant, which in turn transfers the
energy (as steam) to an electric power generator. The sole purpose of the
reactor is to produce the thermal energy (heat) that is carried away from
the reactor (to the steam generator) by the reactor coolant.
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A schematic diagram of a nuclear fission reactor.

In contrast to a bomb, a power reactor must have a coolant fluid
that flows continuously through voids (channels) in the fuel. The coolant flow is designed to remove the heat of the fission process at the
same (balanced) rate that it is produced. The process of constructing
a nuclear fission reactor, then, also appears to follow relatively simple
directions. As in a bomb, there is a requirement for extremely precise
physical arrangement of the various parts of the device. In a reactor,
the arrangement of the fuel must be compartmented to allow passage
(through the fuel assembly) of the material (coolant) that absorbs the
heat at the same rate that the reactor core produces it by nuclear reaction. The nuclear reaction process is controlled with special materials
inserted into (or surrounding) the compartmented fuel assembly that
absorb neutrons produced in the fission process. The position of these
materials (the “control rods”) is adjusted continuously (normally automatically) in the core of the reactor so as to balance the rate of generation of neutrons with the rate at which newly produced neutrons are
used to maintain the desired fission rate as well as the neutrons that are
absorbed (but do not cause fission) in the core or are lost by leakage
from the core. The process is a highly fine-tuned balancing process that
must be maintained very accurately and precisely. If the reactor speeds
up unexpectedly, which it can do if the spatial arrangement of the fuel
changes only slightly (to a denser configuration), the heat produced by
the fission process can overpower the coolant heat removal capacity. If
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the rate of heat production exceeds the heat absorbed by the coolant by
too large an amount, the temperature of the fuel can exceed the melting (and later vaporization) temperature in an extremely short period.
Therein lies the potential for an explosion that might have the potential
to fail the containment. And therein lies the problem of assuring an
“engineered” design of the plant that will prevent a nuclear explosion
of sufficient intensity to destroy any last-barrier containment provided.
Engineering safety of such devices is extremely difficult if there is the
potential for accidental “rearrangements” of the fuel that might result
in very short duration productions of energy capable of destroying the
reactor containment. It is simply a matter of having insufficient time
to react defensively; the safety margin can be very thin. The primary
purpose of this book is to argue that the proposed use of fast-fission reactors
for electric power production is a move in a direction that could result in
accidental increases in energy release that reduce the safety margin of control to an unacceptable level.
The development of nuclear fission reactors for “peaceful” purposes, including electrical power generation, proceeded in parallel
with the development of more efficient and powerful nuclear fission
weapons systems. As fissile uranium (U235) and plutonium (Pu239) were
exceedingly scarce when World War II ended in 1945, the production
of plutonium in nuclear reactors suggested the so-called “breeder” reactor, which, while producing electrical power at a controlled rate, could
produce fissile plutonium (as a by-product) at a rate greater than the
rate that the fissile material was used up to produce power. Producing
plutonium with reactors was the primary purpose of the first so-called
“production” reactors that the AEC operated during the 1950s and
1960s to make plutonium for nuclear weapons. Nuclear power reactors
were soon envisioned to produce plutonium at a rate faster than the
fissile uranium was fissioned (“burned”), resulting in accumulation of
fissile material faster than it was used in the reactors; hence the reactors would “breed” plutonium by converting the non-fissile uranium
(U238) to fissile plutonium. This would mean that the very scarce fissile
uranium available could be used while vastly increasing the available
fission fuel supply—explaining why the first nuclear reactor that generated electrical power, constructed at the National Reactor Testing
Station (NRTS) in Idaho in 1951, was designed to demonstrate the
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practicability of a reactor that would “breed” new fuel faster than it
was being used up in the reactor. That first experimental breeder reactor (EBR-I) was a fast-neutron reactor fueled with enriched uranium
built for that purpose.
To provide a brief introduction to the physics of nuclear fission
reactors, with emphasis on fast-fission reactors, we defer to chapter 10 of
Dr. Richard Webb’s book The Accident Hazard of Nuclear Power Plants,
published by the University of Massachusetts Press, 1976:

The Explosion Hazard of the Advanced “Breeder”
Reactor (LMFBR)
The liquid metal-cooled, fast neutron, breeder reactor (LMFBR) is an
entirely different power reactor concept than the water-cooled reactor.
It is designed specially to produce or “breed” fissionable material as a
by-product, namely, plutonium fuel, by certain nuclear reactions in the
reactor that convert plentiful uranium-238, a weakly fissionable species
of uranium, into plutonium. The objective of the LMFBR is to produce
more plutonium than is consumed in an operating cycle (about 7% more
per year). The excess fuel can then be used to start up other LMFBRs
and to fuel the PWRs and BWRs when the useful reserves of rare fissionable uranium (U-235) are depleted, which is estimated to occur in
about thirty years.4 Hence the PWRs and BWRs will ultimately depend
on the LMFBR. (The reserves and present stockpiles of U-238 would
last the U.S. for a thousand years or so, using the combination of LMFBRs and the water reactors.)
The AEC has projected that about one thousand large LMFBRs
would eventually be built, along with a like number of water-cooled
reactors.5 A license application to build the “LMFBR Demonstration
Plant” in Tennessee is presently pending; and a smaller LMFBR-like
reactor, called the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), is under construction,
which is to be used to test LMFBR fuels under LMFBR core conditions
encountered in normal operation. The FFTF differs from an LMFBR
in that the plutonium-fueled core is not surrounded by uranium 238
for breeding purposes; otherwise, it is basically the same as an LMFBR,
from the standpoint of accident hazards.
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Unfortunately, the LMFBR has a power excursion (nuclear runaway) potential—indeed, a potential for nuclear explosion as distinguished from a steam explosion—which is even more serious than that
of the water-cooled reactors.6 The LMFBR explosion potential has
extremely grave implications. Especially because such a nuclear explosion would produce radioactive plutonium dust, which is extremely
toxic. A steam explosion, or more accurately, a “coolant vapor explosion,” is defined as the explosive vaporization (boiling) of coolant due
to the contact of the coolant with extremely hot, molten fuel. This
appears to be the only possible mode of explosion in the water-cooled
reactors. A nuclear explosion, on the other hand, is defined as an explosive vaporization of the fuel itself, which involves higher temperatures
and potentially a much stronger explosion than a coolant vapor explosion. An LMFBR could also produce strong coolant vapor explosions
upon melting, which could add to the explosion force or by themselves
be dangerous. As will be discussed, nuclear explosions of the order of
20,000 pounds TNT-equivalent are theoretically possible. For comparison, the maximum economical containment capability is about 1000
pounds TNT.7 Thus, such an explosive power excursion would vaporize
the entire core, rupture the containment, and blow, say, half of the core,
amounting to tons of radioactive plutonium, into the atmosphere and
boil off practically all of the fission products and blow them into the
atmosphere as well. Moreover, the core vaporization process presumably would dispense the plutonium and fission products in the form
of a superfine dust, causing severe, geographically widespread, ground
contamination.
The consequences of such a heavy product release were estimated
in chapter 1 (of Webb). The additional consequences due to plutonium
release could be even worse. Because of the extreme toxicity of the plutonium, its release (assuming two tons) and its long life (up to 600
to 24,000 years “half-life,” depending on the isotopic species of plutonium) could cause permanent abandonment of over 150,000 square
miles (an area the size of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and half of Pennsylvania combined). This estimate is based on simply substituting plutonium
for the fission products in the atmospheric dispersal-fallout calculation
of the WASH-740 report (that is, no extrapolations)8 and finding that
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the ground contamination level at the boundary of the 130,000 squaremile zone exceeds a proposed contamination limit of one microgram
of plutonium 239 isotope per square meter.9 Actually, an LMFBR core
will contain other, more radioactive, isotopes of plutonium, such that
there will be about three to eight times more Pu 239—equivalent radioactivity than if the core were 100% Pu 239.10 Hence, the equivalent Pu
239 contamination of the 150,000-square-mile zone would be three to
eight micrograms/m2 level proposed as a contamination limit by Willrich and Taylor, who stated that any ground contaminated above one
microgram/m2 “would be likely to be deemed unacceptable for public
health,” 11 and also exceeds the Rasmussen Report’s contamination limit
of three micrograms/m2, above which “relocation” is to be required.12
Incidentally, the above use of the WASH-740 calculation does not
involve those aspects of the WASH-740 analysis which differ with the
Rasmussen Report; the differences appear to arise in the assumptions
of the radioactive fallout dust particle size and contamination limits of
Sr 90 following a meltdown accident, and not in the atmospheric dispersal-fallout aspects, were the dust particle size the same between the
two reports. This assumes that a severe nuclear explosion of an LMFBR
core would generate dust particles of one micron size or less, which
is the basis for the 150,000 square-mile ground contamination value
in WASH-740. In view of the extreme temperature of such a nuclear
explosion, the assumption seems appropriate.
If the “hot particle” theory for lung cancer induction by plutonium
dust, as proposed by Tamplin and Cochran and by Geesaman,13 is correct, then the cancer probability would be 100% for anyone attempting
to live in the 150,000 square mile (or greater) fallout zone of the conceived LMFBR explosion. Furthermore, the plutonium dust, because of
its extremely long half-life, would forever be in the environment. Presumably, it would be mixed with ordinary dust, kicked up by wind erosion and farming, and blown about and spread by the winds to present
a continuous and permanent lung-cancer and other health hazard for
any inhabitants of the contaminated and adjacent land. It is clear, therefore, that the question of the power excursion potential of the LMFBR
is extremely serious. We shall now examine the state of the science of
predicting the LMFBR explosion potential.
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The Basic Theory of Nuclear Explosion in LMFBRs
The LMFBR reactor and coolant system closely resemble the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) except that the fuel rod bundles are each
contained in a coolant channel or “duct” as in a Boiling Water Reactor (BWR). Also, the batch of fuel rods which comprise the core is
surrounded by a thick outer ring of rods containing uranium 238 for
breeding plutonium, and of each core rod, only the middle vertical section actually contains the fuel, with the top and bottom containing U
238. Hence, the core is completely surrounded by a “blanket” of U 238
rods. The coolant ducts containing each bundle of rods run the full
length of the rods.
The reactor physics and the power excursion theory for an LMFBR
are similar to those for a water-cooled reactor; except that liquid metal
(heated sodium) is used as a coolant instead of water. The absence of
water means that the energetic (fast) neutrons emitted by the atomic
fissioning process are not slowed down within the core (it turns out
that the fast neutrons enable the breeding process to work); but since
fast neutrons are less effective in causing fissioning, the concentration
or “enrichment” of fissionable material in the fuel must be higher in
an LMFBR to achieve a critical reactor—over five times higher than
a PWR or BWR. This higher fuel enrichment means that should
the LMFBR fuel rods be compacted, either by a meltdown or by an
explosion which compresses part of the core, the reactivity might not
decrease, as it would in a water-cooled reactor, but could increase.14
The reason for this reverse reactivity effect is that in a water reactor the fuel material, being less enriched in fissionable material, cannot
sustain a fission chain reaction (criticality), even if fully compacted,
unless the water is present between the fuel rods to slow down the
neutrons and thereby increase their effectiveness for causing fission.
Fuel compaction in a water-cooled reactor would squeeze out water and
thus would reduce the reactivity, that is, shut down the fission chain
reaction. On the other hand, the compaction of concentrated LMFBR
fuel will increase the reactivity, since the nature of highly enriched
fissionable material is such that it can be made critical if enough of it
is brought together, which the compaction process accomplishes. (An
atomic bomb is detonated by compacting extremely rapidly a mass
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of highly enriched fissionable material with a surrounding TNT-like
charge.)
What makes the compaction problem especially serious is that only
about 2% core volume reduction, such as could easily occur upon core
melting, would raise the reactivity to above the delayed neutron fraction (which is about 0.3% for plutonium-fueled LMFBRs) and thus
trigger a power excursion.15 Yet the potential for fuel compaction in an
LMFBR is large, since only about 50% of the core volume is taken up
by fuel rods, and the rest by the coolant. Hence, the core compaction
potential is over 50%,16 should the coolant be expelled or drained, leaving a void for fuel to enter; again, fuel compaction occurs whenever fuel
fills voided coolant space between the fuel rods. Also, upon melting, the
fuel rods of the core would lose their rigidity, and the fuel would then
be easily compressible, as by gravity compaction.
Furthermore, it turns out that the rapid expulsion of the liquid
metal coolant, as in boiling, can increase the reactivity in an LMFBR as
well, due to complicated nuclear effects. This is in contrast with watercooled reactors, where a loss of coolant will at least reduce the reactivity
and thereby shut down the fissioning. Finally, due to its size, a large
LMFBR core will contain several “critical mass” loads of fuel, if fully
compacted, so that an explosion due to an initial power excursion might
rapidly compact a region of the core enough to make it prompt critical,
thereby setting off a secondary, more severe excursion. In general, the
more rapid the core compaction, the greater the rate of reactivity rise
and the resultant power excursion.
In short, the LMFBR is prone to autocatalytic reactivity accidents—that is, the reactor is its own catalyst (for generating power
excursions, since fuel overheating due to some malfunction can cause
a core meltdown or cooling boiling, which in turn could conceivably
generate disastrous secondary excursions by some rapid recompaction
process before the fissioning would be finally stopped by “core disassembly”—blowing the core completely apart by explosion.
Incidentally, the LMFBRs, like the water-cooled reactors, are being
designed with a negative Doppler reactivity effect which can safely terminate minor power excursions caused by slight reactivity rises above
the prompt critical reactivity level, the threshold for power excursion.
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The Doppler effect has been demonstrated for LMFBRs in power
excursion experiments using a small LMFBR reactor called SEFOR.
However, the AEC’s characterization of these SEFOR tests can be
very misleading. Said the AEC in their Proposed Final Environmental
Statement for the LMFBR program—“In some of the experiments in
SEFOR, the reactivity was intentionally increased well beyond prompt
critical, and the rapid transient that resulted was controlled by the
negative Doppler reactivity effect.” 17 This statement can be taken to
imply that SEFOR proved that the LMFBR can tolerate strong reactivity rises—“well beyond prompt critical.” But this is not true, for the
reactivity in the SEFOR tests was barely raised beyond prompt critical.
Numerically, it was only .06% (% reactivity units) beyond prompt critical,18 compared to, say, 1% for a severe power excursion.19 Moreover, the
Doppler strength in SEFOR was made three to four times greater than
it would be in an LMFBR accident situation.20
With this background, we are ready to more carefully consider the
question of the potential for a fast-neutron fission reactor to suffer, as a
result of accident or natural-disaster-caused damage, a nuclear explosion of sufficient power to destroy the reactor containment and allow a
catastrophic release of radioactive fuel and fission products to the environment. It seems appropriate to first consider carefully the worst-case
implications of such a release.
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Catastrophic Release
of Radioactive Materials

In an accident involving a plutonium reactor, a couple of tons of
plutonium can melt.
Edward Teller, 1908–2013

Before considering further the potential for catastrophic releases of
radioactive materials from reactors designed for generating electricity,
we should quantify the hazards that could have been realized as a result
of accident at SEFOR. The magnitude of the radioactivity hazards that
attended the operation of the SEFOR experimental reactor should not
be considered comparable to commercial nuclear reactors, then or now,
with two exceptions.
Most importantly, SEFOR was a fast reactor operating with
enriched plutonium fuel. The heightened potential for a large-scale
release of aerosolized plutonium to the atmosphere posed a new and
highly contentious risk to the public—because of plutonium’s potential
use as bomb material and its reputation for extreme radiotoxicity if it
gains entry to specific organs in the human body. We will return to the
plutonium question, but first we should quantify the risks at SEFOR of
the fission-product materials that accumulated in the reactor.
The largest quantity of radioactive fission-product material contained in SEFOR at any time during its operation was a small fraction
of that contained in typical commercial power reactors such as the two
~1,000-megawatt (electric) plants operating today on the Arkansas River
some 80 miles distant. SEFOR’s fuel content was much smaller, and
SEFOR was operated only intermittently—to meet the specific needs
of the research program designed to address questions relating directly
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to public safety (primarily the demonstration of the safety feature associated with a negative Doppler coefficient). During most of SEFOR’s
approximately three-year operating period, the reactor was charged
with approximately 380 kilograms (836 pounds) of plutonium and (in
total) generated 25,764 megawatt-hours of thermal energy (heat) during a total operating time of 3,895 hours (162.3 days). In contrast, a
single 1,000-megawatt (electric) reactor, “burning” uranium, operating
steadily for three years (typical period between refueling) would produce approximately 3,500 x 3 x 365 x 24 = 92 million, megawatt-hours
of thermal energy (heat). Approximating the thermal energy released
for each plutonium nucleus fissioned to be 200 MeV, the number of
fuel nuclei fissions that would have occurred in SEFOR compared to a
single commercial reactor during a three-year period would be:
SEFOR
3 million billion billion
1,000 MW Plant   10 billion billion billion
The amount of radioactive fission products produced, which is
directly proportional to the number of fissions occurring, is more than
3000 times less for SEFOR than for a 1,000-megawatt fast-breeder
plant. As the quantity of accumulated fission products was much lower
in the SEFOR reactor, and since the amount of fission products contained in the reactor at any time determines the maximum amount
possible to be released in an accident, the fission product content of the
SEFOR reactor was of greatly reduced concern compared to a commercial plant.
But there were important hazards attending the operation of
SEFOR that are not present in the typical commercial nuclear power
plants operating then or now. To our knowledge, the siting of SEFOR
near Strickler, Arkansas, was unique in that it was the first nuclear reactor containing a substantial amount of plutonium as fuel (approaching
a half-ton) that had ever been sited anywhere in the free world except
on a government-controlled area intended to provide a secure “safe”
separation distance from the public. While located in a very low population density rural area in the Ozark Mountains, the SEFOR reactor
was on a relatively small (640-acre) site with minimal security provided
for control of access.
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The “unique” hazards at SEFOR were two “special” materials used
in the reactor:
• The primary fuel was the 239 isotope of plutonium, acknowledged
to be the choice material for construction of nuclear fission weapons,
and considered to be one of the most radiotoxic materials known
should it gain access to the interior of the human body, particularly
the lungs and bone tissue.
• The coolant used to remove the fission heat was liquid sodium,
which is highly flammable if contacted with air or water. In addition, the sodium becomes radioactive as it cools the reactor, adding
to the inventory of radioactive materials that could potentially be
released. The radioactive sodium was primarily a disposal problem,
rather than a primary hazard to the public, due to the limited reactor
operation time and the containment provided.
The use of sodium as coolant poses challenging fire and explosion
hazards and can complicate the design of the containment structure
that forms the last defense against explosion events that could result in
catastrophic release of radioactive materials to the environment. Nevertheless, this book focuses primarily on the hazards presented by the
plutonium—because the plutonium fuel enriched to approximately
20% presented a new potential for an accidental nuclear explosion that
might fail the final barrier to a catastrophic release of the fuel in aerosol
(hot-particle) form to the atmosphere.
In order to simplify our task, we focus on the additional risks introduced if fast-neutron reactors replace thermal or slow-neutron reactors
for generation of electric power. It is important to emphasize at the outset that the hazardous nature of both the extremely radiotoxic fissionable (fuel) materials and the fission products that inevitably accumulate
during the operation of any nuclear fission reactor (slow or fast neutron)
pose the primary hazards that differentiate the nuclear electric energy
industry from the fossil fuel energy industry. We know that the potential
consequences to the public of releases of large amounts of reactor fissionproduct contents, whether from thermal or fast-breeder reactors (of the
same electric power generation capacity), pose similar risks to the public
and the environment. This fact enables us to focus primarily on the
additional risks associated with the adoption of fast-reactor technology.
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So, the primary safety problem considered in this book becomes
that of ensuring against very large amounts of both the nuclear fuel and
accumulated fission products in a fast-neutron reactor being melted and
vaporized—producing temperatures and pressures that could explosively
breach the containment and allow catastrophic release into the atmosphere. Since the operation was of limited duration, the primary radioactivity hazards at SEFOR at the time of the December 1971 experiments
considered here focus on the plutonium. Since we want to emphasize in
this book the additional risks involving catastrophic releases of aerosolized fuel particles into the atmosphere, we first consider the baseline state
of knowledge about the hazards of releases of radioactive fission products
from reactors at the time the SEFOR experiments were completed.

The AEC-Acknowledged Public Hazards of C
 atastrophic
Accidental Releases of Fission Products from C
 ommercial
Nuclear Reactors during the Period of SEFOR’s
Construction and Operation
Published estimates of damages that could result from large accidental
releases of fission products were first prepared by experts for the government in 1957. The results were so threatening to the future of commercial
power ventures being considered that the AEC exerted great pressure to
try and minimize the concerns of the public. The AEC’s task was difficult because the predicted hazards exceeded in magnitude that of any
industrial (nonnatural) hazard that had been considered to that time. Ultimately, the AEC (and its successor government agencies) adopted methods
of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) that rely on mathematical predictions of the likelihood of such accidents occurring to make the case that
the risk could be “acceptable” in view of the positive benefits provided.
But there is a deep polarization of public opinion on such matters.
In our opinion, the polarization is so profound that it is far beyond our
ability to affect it in this book. We believe it is the most important question that must be answered by the regulatory agencies involved—the
question of the acceptability of the risks to us all.
Our approach will be to briefly define the state of the argument that
faces us as we consider the present proposals to jump-start the nuclearelectricity-generation industry using a new class of nuclear fast-fission
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reactors. As we do not want to attempt to address the stalemate that
has developed in the public sector about the acceptability of the risks of
nuclear power that could result from catastrophic accidental releases of
radioactive fission-products from existing nuclear electric power plants,
we will attempt here only to identify quasi-quantitatively the additional
hazards, and the potential severity thereof, that could result from widespread adoption of fast-reactor technology. We believe those additional
hazards are potentially game-changing.
To establish a baseline from which to compare the additional risks
of fast-reactor technology, we begin with a brief description of the
AEC’s attempt in 1957 to inform the public of the hazards that could
be realized from credible accidental releases of radioactive nuclear fission products to the atmosphere. In our opinion, the questions raised
by WASH-740, based as it was on consideration by competent experts
of the worst-case credible accidental release of such materials that
might occur (in 1957), have never been satisfactorily addressed. Indeed,
it appears that the study was never satisfactorily (or publicly) updated
by the government to reflect the increase in size of the reactors that are
in operation today compared to the reactors chosen for analysis in 1957.

WASH-740
Theoretical Possibilities and C
 onsequences of Major
Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants
Letter of Transmittal to Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
March 22, 1957.
Hon. Carl T. Durham,
Chairman Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States.
Dear Mr. Durham:
There is transmitted herewith a report of a study of the possible consequences in terms of injury to persons and damage to property, if certain

54 | Thin Safety Margin

hypothetical major accidents should occur in a typical large nuclear
power reactor. More than two score leading experts in the sciences and
engineering specialties participated in this study.
We are happy to report that the experts all agree that the chances
that major accidents might occur are exceedingly small. This study
constitutes a part of the commission’s continuing effort on a broad
front to understand and resolve this problem of possible reactor hazards so that we may proceed expanding atomic energy industry with
full confidence that there will be few reactor accidents and that such as
do occur will have only minor consequences. This effort and the work
of translating the results into affirmative, concrete safeguards for protection of the public will, of course, be continued and expanded. Since
the beginning of the reactor program the experts and the Congress
and the public and the Commission have all been concerned with the
causes of and the possible magnitude of damage from reactor accidents
and with means of prevention. The subject was considered important
enough to command four of the 60-odd sessions of the International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva eighteen
months ago which, as you will recall, we initiated. One conference
paper in particular gave estimates of the theoretical magnitude of damage. In May of last year, Dr. Libby presented to your Committee some
estimations of the possible extent of harm and damage should a major
accident occur.
This study has taken the form in which it is now presented to you
as a means of responding to the Committee’s specific request of last
July 6. To produce such a study, it was necessary to stretch possibility
far out toward its extreme limits. Some of the worst possible combinations of circumstances that might conceivably occur were included
in the hypotheses in order that we might assess their consequences.
The study must be regarded as a rough estimation of the consequences
of unlikely though conceivable combinations of failure and error and
weather conditions; it is not in any sense a prediction of any future
conditions.
This has been a difficult study to make. There has fortunately been
little reactor accident experience upon which to base estimates. Nuclear
reactors have been operated since December 2, 1942, with a safety
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record far better than that of even the safest industry. More than 100
reactor years of regular operating experience have been accumulated,
including experience with reactors of high power and large inventories
of fission products, without a single personal injury and no significant
depositions of radioactivity outside of the plant area. There have been
a few accidents with experimental reactor installations as contrasted
with the perfect record of safety of the regularly operating reactors. But
even these accidents did not affect the public. This record which shows
that safe operation can be achieved is due to skillful design, careful
construction, and competent operation.
Looking to the future, the principle on which we have based our
criteria for licensing nuclear power reactors is that we will require
multiple lines of defense against accidents which might release fission
products from the facility. Only by means of highly unlikely combinations of mechanical and human failures could such releases occur.
Furthermore, the Government and industry are investing heavily in
studies to learn more about the principles of safe reactor design and
operation.
Framing even hypothetical circumstances under which harm and
damage could occur and arriving at estimations of the theoretical
extent of the consequences proved a complex task. To make the study
we enlisted the services of a group of scientists and engineers of the
Brookhaven National Laboratory and of another group of experts to
serve as a steering committee. Through recent months these men have
met with many additional expert advisors to offer judgment on the estimates arrived at. We are not aware of such a study having been undertaken for any other industry. We venture to say that if a similar study
were to be made for certain other industries, with the same free rein to
the imagination, we might be startled to learn what the consequences of
conceivable major catastrophic accidents in those other industries could
be in contrast with the action experience in those industries.
Remembering that this study analyzes theoretical possibilities and
consequences of reactor accidents, we might note here the judgments
presented on (1) possible consequences of major accidents and (2) the
likelihood of occurrence of such major reactor accidents. The portion
of the study dealing with consequences of theoretical accidents started
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with the assumption of a typical power reactor, of 500,000 kilowatts
thermal power, in a characteristic power reactor location. Accidents
were postulated to occur after 180 days of operation, when essentially
full fission product inventories had been built up. Three types of accidents which could cause serious public damages were assumed. Pessimistic (higher hazard) values were chosen for numerical estimates
of many of the uncertain factors influencing the final magnitude of
the estimated damages. It is believed that these theoretical estimates
are greater than the damage which would actually occur even in the
unlikely event of such accidents.
For the three types of assumed accidents, the theoretical estimates indicated that personal damage might range from a lower limit of none injured
or killed to an upper limit, in the worst case, of about 3,400 killed and
about 43,000 injured.
Theoretical property damages ranged from a lower limit of about one
half million dollars to an upper limit in the worst case of about seven billion
dollars. This latter figure is largely due to assumed contamination of land
with fission products.
Under adverse combinations of the conditions considered, it was estimated that people could be killed at distances up to 15 miles, and injured at
distances of about 45 miles. Land contamination could extend for greater
distances.
In the large majority of theoretical reactor accidents considered, the
total assumed losses would not exceed a few hundred million dollars.
(emphasis added)
As to the probabilities of major reactor accidents, some experts
held that numerical estimates of a quantity so vague and uncertain as
the likelihood of occurrence of major reactor accidents have no meaning. They declined to express their feeling about this probability in
numbers. Others, though admitting similar uncertainty, nevertheless
ventured to express their opinions in numerical terms. Estimations so
expressed of the probability of reactor accidents having major effects on
the public ranged from a chance of one in 100,000 to one in a billion
per year for each large reactor. However, whether numerically expressed
or not, there was no disagreement in the opinion that the probability of
major reactor accidents is exceedingly low.
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Some of the reasons for this belief follow:
First, industry and government are determined to maintain safety
and protect the health and property of the public from nuclear hazards.
The Congress has authorized and we in the Commission are carrying
out a program of close and careful regulation and inspection. Thus the
potential hazard of this new industry has been recognized in advance
of its development and brought under a strict system of safety control
before the occurrence of the incidents which in other fields have marked
the birth of new industry and have subsequently led to control.
Secondly, the challenge of this new and important venture in man’s
application of the forces of nature has attracted able and energetic men
into the work of assuring safe design and operation.
In the third place, multimillion-dollar efforts in research and development, both public and private, are directed toward identifying and
solving safety problems. We know of no other industry where so much
effort has been and is being spent on the definition and solution of
safety problems.
Fourthly, the cost to the industry and government of reactor accidents, even of a minor nature, would be very high—much higher than
for accidents in other industry. Self-interest, therefore, as well as public
interest dictates avoidance of accidents.
To sum up, the report affirms that a major reactor accident is
extremely unlikely. To reduce the matter of assumed hazards to comparative numbers, let us take the most pessimistic assumptions used
and apply them to a case of 100 power reactors in operation in the
United States.
Under these assumptions, the chances of a person being killed in
any year by a reactor accident would be less than 1 in 50 million. By
contrast, the present odds of being killed in any year by an automobile
accident in the United States stand at about one in 5,000.
We are not surprised by the contents of the report, nor are we
made complacent. The report serves to identify areas where continued research and development are needed, and areas where emphasis
is needed in the further development of our regulatory program. It
gives renewed emphasis to our belief that our research and development
program and our regulatory program in the nuclear power field must
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continue with vigor to the end that the “conceivable” catastrophe shall
never happen.
We would appreciate your regarding the attachment as an “advance”
report. It is being reviewed for editorial and mechanical errors and
omissions. Copies of the report as corrected will be furnished to you at
an early date.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Harold S. Vance,
Acting Chairman

WASH-740 Was Not Updated
The results of WASH-740, prepared by a blue-ribbon panel of scientists
from the Brookhaven National Laboratory, delivered an unsettling picture to the public about the risks of embarking on a program to develop
a large number of fission reactors for generating electric power. The
predictions of death, injury, and possible abandonment of large tracts
of land downwind of such accidents appeared to exceed any hazards
expected previously from industrial enterprises.
WASH-740 was never updated to reflect the changes that would be
required when much larger reactors were being suggested by the 1970s.
Then in 1976, Dr. Richard E. Webb, who had testified in 1972 about
the nuclear explosion hazards of fast reactors before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress (see Notes), published
the book The Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants. In the book,
Dr. Webb updated the predictions of WASH-740 to account for the size
of reactors planned in 1976, nominally 1,000 megawatts, from the reactor size assumed in WASH-740, ~200 megawatts (electric). Dr. Webb
assumed that the damages would scale directly with the total fission
rate, which would be approximately six times larger in 1970 than in
1957. Quoting Webb:
To estimate the maximum sequences of any reactor accident, we
adjust the estimates of the maximum possible reactor accident
as given in the 1957 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) report,
Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents
in Large Nuclear Power Plants (WASH-740), to account for the
six-fold increase in the highly intense, short-lived radioactivity
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and the fifteen-fold increase in the long-lived radioactivity in
present day reactors. The maximum conceivable consequences
of the worst accident are as follows: (1) a lethal cloud of radiation with a range of seventy-five miles and a width of one mile;
(2) evacuation or severe living restrictions for a land area the
size of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio combined (120,000 square
miles), lasting a year or possibly longer; and severe long-term
restrictions on agriculture due to strontium 90 fallout over
a land area of the size of about one half of the land east of
the Mississippi River (500,000 square miles), lasting one to
several years, with dairying prohibited “for a very long time”
over a 150,000 square mile area. There are other consequences
not here estimated for water-cooled reactors, such as genetic
damage. The potential accident consequences for the LMFBR—
especially with respect to plutonium contamination, which may be
a gravely serious lung-cancer hazard—will be discussed later, since
they will depend on the explosion hazard unique to that reactor.
(emphasis added)

Plutonium Fuel
The bulk of the radioactive materials contained in any operating reactor
comprises the fuel and its fission products. SEFOR was fueled with plutonium, the core enriched to roughly 20% plutonium with the balance
primarily uranium 238. Because of the relatively low total production
of fission products in the SEFOR reactor during its operating period
(compared to a commercial reactor), the focus of the accident hazard
potential for SEFOR was the plutonium. So what is the special concern
about plutonium?
Typical commercial reactors operating in the 1960s “burned” U235.
Further, all of these reactors were (and remain) “thermal,” or slow-
neutron reactors, with average neutron speeds around 2,000 meters
per second (around 4,500 miles per hour). The exceptions during that
time period (1950s and ’60s) were SEFOR and a commercial, though
“demonstration,” fast-neutron “breeder” reactor known as FERMI 1,
which was constructed on the shore of Lake Erie about 30 miles from
Detroit. FERMI 1 was fueled with enriched U235 metal, whereas
SEFOR was fueled with enriched Pu239 oxide. FERMI 1 and SEFOR
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were fast-neutron reactors, with fission neutrons driving the chain reactions with average neutron speeds typically about 20 million meters
per second (around 45 million miles per hour). Importantly, plutonium
oxide, in contrast to plutonium or uranium metal, had been shown
to exhibit a much larger negative Doppler coefficient. It was the magnitude of this negative Doppler coefficient that constituted the safety
margin that was to be demonstrated at SEFOR.
Hence, SEFOR became, in the mid-1960s, the first (relatively) large
fast-neutron reactor fueled with plutonium to be built in the United
States. The SEFOR reactor was the first (large) reactor to couple the
potential for very fast-neutron reaction rates (more challenging to control than the slow-neutron “thermal” reactors) with the use of plutonium as fuel. Because of the perceived high hazard of plutonium should
it be released to the atmosphere, and the increased risk of nuclear explosion energy release that accompanies the operation of fast reactors,
concerns of knowledgeable scientists, medical doctors, and industry/
government parties were very real.
The general population of northwest Arkansas and surrounding
states appears to have been largely unaware of such concerns, instead
receiving assurances by the AEC and the nuclear industry that the
reactor would safely “demonstrate” that widespread fears of a nuclear
explosion of magnitude to allow significant amounts of the plutonium
in the reactor to enter the atmosphere were unfounded for the fast
reactors then planned to be fueled with plutonium oxide (not metallic plutonium). It didn’t hurt the government’s promotional case that
the proposed commercial fast-breeder reactors (nearly a thousand were
tentatively planned), all burning oxides (oxygenated forms of the plutonium), were widely viewed as the best, if not the only, potential solution
to the country’s energy problems. The nuclear explosion question was
now going to be addressed with the use of plutonium oxides as fuel.
How well it would be addressed is the principal concern of this book.

Important Additional Hazards of Plutonium
Plutonium began appearing in measurable amounts after about 1940 as
a result of research driven by the development of nuclear fission weapons. It soon became the fissile (fissionable) material of choice for nuclear
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weapons production. The first microgram quantity of plutonium was
produced at the University of California in 1941. Within a few years,
plutonium production reactors were operating on the Hanford Reservation spread out along the Columbia River in Washington State.
The plutonium produced in those so-called “production” reactors was
chemically separated into near pure form in purpose-built separation
plants at Hanford.
The hazards of plutonium are due to its chemical (heavy metal)
toxicity and its radioactivity. Plutonium is considered one of the most
radiotoxic materials known. The first bomb-grade plutonium at Hanford was assembled as a hollow sphere approximately 4 inches in diameter weighing about 6 kilograms (about 14 pounds), transported to the
Trinity site in New Mexico and exploded in August 1945. A similar
plutonium sphere was used in the bomb that was dropped on Nagasaki.
In the Trinity test and in the Nagasaki bomb, only about one-fifth of
the core, approximately 1 kilogram, fissioned, and approximately 1 gram
(1/30th of an ounce) of its mass was converted into explosive energy
equivalent to ~21,000 tons of TNT.
Most importantly to the population around the SEFOR site, the
reactor’s enriched plutonium fuel made it a fast reactor, with potential
neutron speeds tens of thousands of times faster than occurs in thermal
reactors. Such neutron speeds results in much higher fission reactivity
rates, which makes the engineering design for reactor control much more
challenging. The result is a heightened potential for accidental explosions; enrichment to the 20% level is an important step along the path
required to assemble a nuclear weapon with very high explosion yield—
witness the present heightened concerns about the dangers of fissile fuel
enrichment by countries potentially unfriendly to the United States.
We will very soon focus on the explosion potential of fast reactors. However, as we are primarily concerned about the potential for
radioactive substances accidentally released from reactors to enter the
air (enabling inhalation by humans), we will first briefly consider what
we think we know, and in some considerable measure has been verified,
about quantifying the potential for humans to inhale air containing
radioactive materials and the damage that can result. Of course, the
libraries are filled with books containing such information, but it is so
extensive and complicated that there is little likelihood of the general
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population achieving a satisfactorily complete understanding of that
scientific knowledge to be able to collectively agree on the dangers
involved and the measures that can be taken to mitigate the hazards.
Instead, the public continues to argue, largely utilizing various forms
of wishful thinking, that the hazards to humankind of adopting such
technological measures as fast plutonium-fueled reactors to generate
electricity are overblown, in much the same way as the general population seems split on the dangers of global warming. It is ironic that
the present argument for the “nuclear” solution, involving considerable uncertainty, and so presciently negated with the occurrence of
nuclear accidents “that couldn’t or wouldn’t happen” (like Chernobyl
and Fukushima), is being suggested to solve the problem of global climate change. We believe that either of these threats, in time, could “do
us in”; hence we must get this argument right lest we create even more
problems that we cannot solve. Our first step is to set down briefly what
the concerns are for the radioactivity hazards that could attend largescale plutonium fast-reactor operation to generate electricity.
While plutonium is “new,” radioactivity has been with us all
along. It is common knowledge that radioactive materials are pervasive
throughout the earth and its oceans and atmosphere; indeed, radioactive materials, and the attendant hazards, are accepted as pervading
the entire universe. But there has been an important change during the
last century, beginning about 1940—we have managed to rearrange the
materials composing the earth so as to concentrate them in more compact form for our (presumed) benefit. We have learned how to “assemble” or “concentrate” the unstable elements like uranium and heavier
elements (like plutonium) in configurations with which we can design
systems to release the powerful forces that hold the atoms of these materials together. The splitting of the nuclei of such atoms, which requires
their assembly in greatly purified form, releases energy in the form
of heat at rates thousands of times greater than we could accomplish
before we “discovered” the mechanism of chain reaction nuclear fission.
The “assembly” discovery led to our building weapons that produce
extraordinary explosion power utilizing uncontrolled fission processes,
but the technology involved was soon extended to build nuclear power
plants to provide controlled release of fission-generated heat energy to
drive electricity generators. We now are well into an age of crippling fear
of the potential for accidents in nuclear power stations to suffer releases of
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radioactive materials to the environment with catastrophic consequences
extending from the release site to very large distances—potentially
involving large segments of the human, plant, and animal populations.
The amount of radioactivity resulting from nuclear electric power production in the world already may exceed the amount of radioactive materials that could be released if all of the atomic weapons existing were
exploded (this amount is thought to be classified), and it is expected to
grow even further, with few solutions for satisfactorily safe disposal in
sight. Such is the present state of the nuclear waste disposal dilemma.
The problem is at once simple to state and extraordinarily difficult to
solve. The radioactive fission products that build up in fission reactors
must be contained safely within the plants until they are required to be
removed (periodically, for refueling). When they are removed, they must
be placed where they cannot escape until the radioactive decay processes
proceed to the point where the radioactivity hazard “disappears” (which
it will eventually do). The problem is that the time period for radioactive
decay processes to reach safe levels ranges, depending on the individual
species (of which there are hundreds), from time periods of a few minutes
(or small parts thereof) to thousands of years. Humankind has thus far
been unable to solve this problem, which appears to be intractable, perhaps more for political/sociological reasons than scientific ones.

Fast-Reactor Explosion Hazards
This book’s principal focus is the potential for accidental explosions
occurring in fast nuclear reactors that could result in the release of large
amounts of radioactive materials, including plutonium or other fissile
isotopes of trans-uranium materials, into the environment. Aside from
the releases of natural radioactive materials that occur in nuclear (electric) power generation due to mining and preparation of nuclear fuel
and some arguably minor but necessary “planned” releases of radioactive gases produced in operating reactors, the potential for radioactive
materials contaminating the earth as a result of nuclear-powered electricity generation rests in large part in our lack of inability to ensure
against releases due to accidental or intentional (terrorist) breaching of
the reactors and their containment structures. In light of Chernobyl
and Fukushima, as well as several other potentially disastrous near
misses, we have a long way to go in solving this problem.
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Increasing fears of “radioactivity” were spurred by the results of
the atomic bomb attacks on Japan, where the direct results of exposure
to significant amounts of radiation were extreme, injuring and killing
people in huge numbers within days or weeks. Following WWII, the
increased releases of radioactive materials—especially associated with
open-air weapons testing that resulted in exposure to the public to great
distances by winds carrying the airborne radioactive gases and liquids
and solids small enough to remain suspended in the atmosphere—
resulted in the fallout problem. We now know that a large part of the
radioactive materials in the “clouds” produced by nuclear weapons
remain suspended in the atmosphere for sufficient time to allow some
of the material to become effectively diffused throughout the earth’s
atmosphere. It is by no means uniformly distributed, but we can be sure
that it has, or will, spread throughout the atmosphere, and indeed, in
sufficient time, the entire earth. The part that does not stay suspended
falls out onto the earth, constituting additional routes by which the
radioactive materials can contact humans. Finally, such radioactive
materials, which by definition are unstable, change to other materials
via a process called radioactive decay. The so-called “daughter” products may also be radioactive, which means that all of the materials so
formed will ultimately further decay into products until materials that
are stable—that is, not radioactive—result.
In the case of electric-power-generating reactors, the radioactive
products of the fission process and the subsequent decay processes that
inevitably occur could theoretically be contained so that humanity is
never exposed to significant amounts. Significant amounts are generally
considered to be amounts that would not exceed those already present on earth. What “significantly” means is, like the nuclear explosion
potential of fast reactors, at best argumentative.

Explosion Containment
Research for this book showed that at the time SEFOR was constructed:
• The maximum (economical) containment that could be provided to
ensure that a major release of aerosolized fuel and fission products
from a commercial-size LMFBR could not occur was estimated to be
about 1,000 pounds (1/2 ton) of TNT explosive equivalent. Provision
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of significantly more robust containment appeared, on its own, to
make the plants economically uncompetitive.
• The maximum possible (nuclear) explosion yield that could occur
in a fast reactor due to accident or natural disaster causes was then
argumentative, at best, and had been predicted by reputed scientists
to exceed by an order of magnitude (at least ten times) the explosion
energy yield that could be economically provided for.

Arkansas Gazette, May 15, 1964
Arkansas congressmen and businessmen pose with officials of the
AEC at a signing of a contract for a multimillion-dollar atomic reactor project near Fayetteville. At right, seated, is Glenn Seaborg,
chairman of the AEC.

SEFOR, operational, about 1970, Strickler, Arkansas.
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FRED
Fast Reactivity Excursion Device
FRED was an electromechanical device designed to accurately change
the vertical position of a poison rod in the center of the reactor core.
When the poison rod was centered in the core, it provided zero positive
reactivity. Reactivity was added by pushing the rod out of the core at
an accurately controlled rate, to an accurately specified position, after
which the rod fell back into the core, terminating the reactivity addition.
The time from start of rod movement to the chosen extent (larger extent
gave increased reactivity addition) was intended in the tests described
to be 0.1 second.

This photo was discovered in a magazine entitled The Russian Disaster:
A Survival Handbook for the Nuclear Age, by Bernard Crossfield, PhD,
published following the Chernobyl, Ukraine, disaster by Paladin Press.
The text that had been added is incorrect; it is not a breeder reactor, nor
is it being charged with fuel. At the time of the photo it was charged with
approximately 900 pounds of plutonium fuel. The photo was taken from
overhead the SEFOR reactor in the refueling cell. The reactor top has
been removed, and the two men suited appear to be installing the FRED
reactivity device. If the men pictured are recognized in this picture, we
would appreciate a contact with the authors.

This photograph, an enlargement of the center section of the previous photo, appears to show the Fast Reactivity Excursion Device being
installed in SEFOR. The FRED was installed in the center of the reactor.

Arkansas Gazette, March 7, 1967
J. Robert Welch (center), president of Southwestern Electric Power Company at Shreveport and president of Southwest Atomic Energy Associates,
which is sponsoring construction of the SEFOR Reactor near Fayetteville,
discusses the project with Dr. Bert Wolfe, manager of SEFOR Engineering and Development (left) and Dr. Karl Cohen, manager of General Electric’s Advanced Products Division, designer and builder of the fast-oxide,
sodium-cooled reactor of which Dr. Cohen is considered the originator.

This picture of the abandoned reactor, in a hayfield overgrown with
trees, was taken from adjacent Arkansas Hwy 265, probably in the period
2000–2010.

2019. The above-ground top half of the steel containment cylinder has
been removed, and the reactor is being extracted.

2019. Installed in a secure container, leaving the site headed to a Nevada
disposal site—after fifty years.

SEFOR demonstrated the Doppler effect for nuclear safety of fastbreeder reactors fueled with plutonium-oxide fuel. Despite the acknowledged importance thereof, this book shows that the results of the SEFOR
experiments did not carry the message of guaranteed safety that the
public was led to believe.

chapter

5

Nuclear Explosion Potential
in Fast Reactors

For the fast breeder to work in its steady-state breeding condition you
probably need something like a half ton of plutonium. In order that it
should work economically in a sufficiently big power-producing unit,
it probably needs quite a bit more than one ton of plutonium. I do
not like the hazard involved. I suggested that nuclear reactors are a
blessing because they are clean. They are clean as long as they function as planned, but if they malfunction in a massive manner, which
can happen in principle, they can release enough fission products to
kill a tremendous number of people. . . . If you put together two tons
of plutonium in a breeder, one tenth of one percent of this material
could become critical. I have listened to hundreds of analyses of what
course a nuclear accident can take. Although I believe it is possible to
analyze the immediate consequences of an accident, I do not believe
it is possible to analyze and foresee the secondary consequences. In an
accident involving a plutonium reactor, a couple of tons of plutonium
can melt. I don’t think anybody can foresee where one or two or five
percent of this plutonium will find itself, and how it will get mixed
with some other material. A small fraction of the original charge can
become a great hazard.
Edward Teller, 1908–2003
In September 1972, Dr. Richard E. Webb appeared before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress in opposition to the
construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (CRBRP). Dr.
Webb testified to the potential danger of nuclear explosions in fast reactors that could be severe enough to compromise the containments then
proposed to prevent catastrophic releases of radioactive materials to the
environment. Webb’s testimony included statements that the AEC was
75
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taking a chance with public safety by approving SEFOR as well as
the CRBRP before sufficient research had been done to determine the
maximum explosion potential that was possible in liquid-metal-cooled
fast reactors. The written record of his testimony was followed by the
AEC’s response, which we believe was unjustifiably dismissive. Webb
prepared a written rebuttal to the AEC’s response and delivered it to the
AEC in July 1973. Webb’s rebuttal was not made public by the AEC (to
our knowledge), but we know the AEC received his rebuttal remarks, as
the University of Arkansas Library determined that a copy of the rebuttal document is held by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
in Washington, D.C.
We obtained a copy of Webb’s rebuttal remarks to the AEC from
Purdue University, whose library holds Dr. Webb’s papers relating to
nuclear safety, in 2014. After careful review, we concluded that the rebuttal remarks, which exceed two hundred pages, constitutes one of the
best discussions of fast nuclear reactor safety explosion hazard potential
(that could be considered understandable by the public) that was available at the time it was written—mid-1973, one year after SEFOR closed.
Webb’s rebuttal “report” is particularly significant because it can be
confirmed that the AEC (now NRC) received it (presumably in 1973).
The rebuttal remains today an excellent example of independent-expert
testimony on the specific subject of fast-reactor explosion potential.
We present here selections pertaining to reactor safety from Dr.
Webb’s testimony to Congress in 1972 followed by selected sections
from the AEC’s response. We then present selected material from
Webb’s rebuttal, which we believe remains insufficiently considered to
this day. Finally, a stand-alone section from Webb’s rebuttal entitled
“Basic Theory of LMFBR Nuclear Runaway in More Detail” is presented. This section provides excellent information for understanding
the limits of nuclear explosion potential in fast reactors. While Webb’s
testimony and his rebuttal will be heavy sledding for the typical reader,
we think it important to make it a matter of public record in this book.
In our opinion, Webb’s presentations, particularly the technical discussions about the potential for nuclear explosions in fast reactors, remain
the most accurate and sober description of such risks available to the
lay reader. Indeed, it is suitable for careful study as groundwork for
students as well as practitioners of nuclear engineering.
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It is our hope that Webb’s statements to Congress and the review
thereof by the AEC in 1972, along with Webb’s rebuttal in 1973, and
the effective dismissal by the AEC of essentially all of the points he
raised less than a year before the AEC was dissolved, will be considered
appropriate for serious consideration by any party desiring to know
more about this critically important subject of nuclear fast-reactor
safety—including the public and students at advanced levels in related
engineering and science disciplines.
The AEC was abolished in 1974. In this chapter, we consider the
relevance of Webb’s submissions to the AEC regarding the fast-reactor
safety debate. Dr. Webb’s statement to Congress and his rebuttal
remarks to the AEC appear below.

Excerpt from Hearings before the Joint C
 ommittee on
Atomic Energy, Congress of the U.S., 92 Congress, Second
Session, Sept. 1972: Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
(LMFBR) Demonstration Plant
Excerpts from Statements by Dr. Richard E. Webb
Bloomington, Ind., September 20, 1972.
John O. Pastore
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Senator Pastore:
I am enclosing my statement concerning the Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast
Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant. Please accept it for inclusion in
the record of your hearings on the LMFBR Demo.
My background and expertise briefly is as follows:
1. Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering, the Ohio State University, March
1972. My Ph.D. thesis concerns the explosion potential of the
LMFBR.
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2.  Served four years (1963–1967) with the AEC’s Division of Naval
Reactors, during which my primary responsibility was for the
nuclear reactor portion of the Shippingport Pressurized Water
Reactor.
a. C ertificate of successful completion, Bettis Engineering
School of the AEC’s Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory (1965)
b. Reactor Plant Training (one month) at the Navy’s DIG Prototype Reactor Plant at the AEC’s Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory (1966).
3. Worked one-half year at Big Rock Point Nuclear Power Station
(Boiling Water Reactor) at Charlevoix, Michigan as associate
engineer with reactor engineering duties in 1967. (I was offered
a position with the LMFBR Program Planning Office in 1968.)
4. B.S. Engineering in Physics, University of Toledo, 1962.
5. Presently preparing a book on criteria and procedure for establishing sound public decision with respect to civilian nuclear
power at Indiana University’s School of Public and Environmental Affairs (Science, Technology and Public Policy section).
Sincerely yours,
Richard E. Webb
Enclosure: Statement on the LMFBR Demonstration Plant.

LMFBR Demonstration Plant
(Statement by Richard E. Webb)
Summary
The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant (LMFBR
Demo) should not be built (not now at least) because the maximum
explosion potential has not been scientifically determined. Because the
LMFBR Demo will contain up to 1.3 tons of Plutonium and a large
amount of fission product radioactivity, which absolutely must not be
allowed to be spewed into the environment by a reactor plant explosion, the unknown explosion potential of the LMFBR Demo makes it
imperative that the present plans for constructing and operating such a
reactor be discarded in favor of further, more thorough, theoretical and
experimental research into the said explosion potential. . . .
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Explosion Potential
The “Environmental Statement” (WASH-1509, April 1972) issued by
the Atomic Energy Commission for the LMFBR Demo states that the
substantiation of the claim that the reactor will be safe must await
the issuance of the preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) when
the construction permit application is filed with the AEC. (See E.S.,
p. 37, 107). But it is obvious from reading the Environmental Statement that the AEC and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have
prejudged the question of safety. For example, Congress has already
authorized the LMFBR Demo and appropriated the money for it (E.S.,
p. 1). F
 urthermore, the AEC asserted in the Environmental Statement
that the provisions in the reactor containment structure for “blast and
missile protection within the inner barrier provide substantial margins
against major potential energy release for all classes of accidents” (E.S.,
p. 54; emphasis added). The AEC added: “While it is impossible to
postulate with precision the detailed course of accidents, including
their likelihood and possible environmental consequences, it is possible
to place bounds on such accidents” (E.S., p. 119; emphasis added).
These statements have no scientific foundation. Based on my
knowledge of the state of the science of LMFBR explosion calculations,
there is no chance that the aforesaid PSAR will substantiate such conclusions. Therefore, the construction of the LMFBR Demo should not
be undertaken until after the necessary theoretical and experimental
research is conducted, if such research demonstrates safety. The alternative is for Congress to recall the authorization and appropriation for
the LMFBR Demo, wait for the issuance of the PSAR, and its review
by the AEC and the Public, then hold public hearings on the safety of
the LMFBR Demo.
The basis for my assertion is contained in my Ph.D. dissertation
(thesis) which was submitted to, and approved by, the faculty authorities in the department of Nuclear Engineering at the Ohio State University. The title of the dissertation is “Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Transients in Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder,
Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs),” the Ohio State University (1971).1
A copy of the dissertation was sent to the director of the AEC’s Division
of Reactor Licensing (Mr. Peter Morris), which the Committee could
borrow.
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To summarize the conclusions of my dissertation, the calculational methods for determining the maximum explosion possible in
an LMFBR have not been developed to include all possibilities, and
their combinations, for autocatalytic phenomena during and after an
initial nuclear runaway. That is, there are conceivable mechanisms by
which “reactivity” can or might be rapidly “inserted” due to the motion
of fuel material resulting from an initial core explosion or meltdown
event. (Recall that in fast reactors, a core meltdown presents a mechanism by which reactivity can increase semi-rapidly and trigger disruptive or explosive power pulses.)2 In other words, an initial event, or
series of events, might cause the reactor to feed itself a massive dose of
“reactivity” which would amplify the initial runaway, or cause a very
severe secondary runaway; either of which might lead to a disastrous
explosion.
When the calculational methods are developed to include all possible autocatalytic effects, they would still need experimental confirmation. Moreover, as I asserted in my thesis (p. 44), the present calculation
methods “have not been confirmed experimentally for power reactor
designs”. For example, it has been claimed by Hirakawa and Klickman3 that the KIWI-TNT power excursion experiment (TNT stands
for Transient Nuclear Tests) has confirmed the MARS fast reactor
excursion computer code. (The basic theory in MARS is the Bethe-Tait
theory, which is partially used in the more advanced explosion codes
such as VENUS. This theory provides the reactivity feedback mechanism that ends or “shuts down” the power excursion, and thereby, limits
the explosion force.) However, though the post facto MARS calculation of energy yield agreed fairly well with the KIWI-TNT measurement, the power pulse height (peak power), pulse shape, and pulse
width as calculated by the MARS code are completely different than
the KIWI-TNT experimental results. I used a simple thermal expansion model which excludes the basic theory in MARS that was thought
to be tested (i.e., the Bethe-Tait theory), and calculated all four of the
above items in excellent agreement with the experimental results.4 This
strongly indicates that the inherent shutdown reactivity mechanism in
the K IWI-TNT experiment was not the Bethe-Tait mechanism, but
one due to the simple thermal expansion of the KIWI core; and that
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agreement between the MARS value of energy releases and experimental measurement was coincidental. In support of my conclusion, Jankus
stated that the “Bethe-Tait assumption is definitely unjustified” for the
KIWI-TNT excursion.5 Furthermore, KIWI was not a fast reactor.
Therefore, the KIWI-TNT explosion test has not been shown to be a
confirmation of LMFBR explosion theories.
The SEFOR power excursion tests, which were performed to confirm the mitigating action of the Doppler effect for fast reactors, cannot be considered as proving out the LMFBR explosion calculational
methods because the SEFOR excursions were not designed to lead to an
explosion.6 The tests involved (1) relatively mild rates of programmed
reactivity insertion, (and then the total reactivity inserted was limited
to a small amount); (2) designed Doppler feedback magnitudes that
were much greater than typical 1000 MWe LMFBR design values; and
(3) automatic termination of the power transient by control rod scram
(probably preprogrammed) to ensure against unexpected secondary
excursions. Because of the strong Doppler and the limited amount of
total reactivity that was inserted, the strongest power excursion tested
was easily stopped with only about a 10% rise in the fuel temperature, which means that the SEFOR tests approached no threshold for
meltdown or explosion. Normally in LMFBR accident calculations
one assumes that the initial reactivity insertion is not limited, but is
unrelenting. Thus in a real accident situation the Doppler effect alone
would not be sufficient to terminate the power excursion, and the core
would continue to generate energy until there is an explosive or disruptive “disassembly” of the core that finally stops the power excursion
and shuts down the reactor, if one could still call a reactor destroyed a
“reactor.” (Just how severe the explosion is and whether aggravated by
autocatalytic effects is my main concern.)
Therefore, although the SEFOR tests were very useful in demonstrating the Doppler mitigating mechanism, and were evidently successful in that regard they provide no confirmation of explosion calculational methods. This is just as well, since there is a report which
indicates that SEFOR was not designed to contain severe explosions.7
With one-half ton of Plutonium in the SEFOR reactor, it appears that
the AEC simply took a chance with the public safety by purposely
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causing power excursions, which one tries normally to prevent in
power reactors, to test a safety effect (Doppler feedback) that was not
beforehand demonstrated in a fast reactor power excursion. (SEFOR is
now being decommissioned now that the tests are finished.) Whereas,
prudence would suggest that such tests involving so much Plutonium
should have been conducted only after a thorough research into autocatalytic reactivity effects was completed to establish the maximum
possible accident. Then prudence would suggest that such a test reactor
would be placed deeply underground just in case something was overlooked. (The EBR-I, BORAX-I, and SPERT-I reactors all suffered accidents because the power excursions were under-calculated.8 But instead,
SEFOR was built above ground and may have been without explosion
containment. Similarly, the LMFBR Demo would be an experiment
with unknowns, involving 1.3 tons of Plutonium, and fission product
Strontium-90 and Cesium-137 and the like. That is, the LMFBR Demo
is simply a chance that will be taken with the health and safety of the
Public if allowed to be built without a firm ground of scientific research
to establish the containment design.
I mentioned so far the lack of experimental confirmation of existing
calculational methods, as well as the inadequacy of the calculational
methods from the standpoint of autocatalytic reactivity effects. The
improved calculational methods for predicting the LMFBR explosion
potential, once developed, would still require experimental confirmation, just as was done to some extent for the Doppler effect in the
SEFOR tests. To be sure, fast reactor explosion tests were proposed by
Nims at the 1963 Argonne National Laboratory Conference on “Breeding, Economics and Safety in Large Fast Power Reactors.” 9 Nims considered the straightforward approach of simply building a prototype
reactor, causing the core to meltdown, and observing the resulting
explosion. Such tests would have to be repeated in a variety of ways
in an effort to cover all possible or conceivable ways in which the core
might meltdown. Nims indicated that the costs for such a series of
tests would be prohibitive, since a series of costly reactors would have
to be built, just to be destroyed. As an alternative he proposed a series
of partial core meltdown experiments, short of explosion, to learn the
manner in which the core would meltdown; and then with a more confident understanding of core meltdown acquired by such tests, full scale
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reactor meltdown tests would be designed and performed to determine
the severity of the explosions associated with the prior established core
meltdown patterns.
Nims argued that this alternate scheme may provide the desired
information regarding LMFBR explosion potential at acceptable cost.
I would add that the development of improved calculational methods
regarding autocatalytic effects, that I contend is necessary, would be
of help in designing such explosion experiments. (Of course, there is
the possibility that such improved calculational methods might predict
with confidence that the explosion potential of LMFBRs is simply too
great to ever consider building LMFBRs at all.) The LMFBR Program
Plan (Volume 10, Safety) provides for studies of the necessity for such
explosion testing.10 (The Plan has adopted the alternate scheme investigated by Nims as that which is to be considered, without mentioning
the more direct method of testing prototype reactors.) I have seen no
results of such studies. Presumably, they are still being conducted. But
regardless of their outcome, until improved theoretical methods are
developed and tested by reactor explosion experiments, claims that the
LMFBR containment structure is designed to contain “all classes of
accidents” and that “it is possible to place bounds on such accidents”
will continue to be groundless. Accordingly, if the United States is to
pursue LMFBR development, we should discard the plans for a demonstration power reactor in favor of further research terminating in
explosion testing, unless the theoretical research proves that LMFBRs
are inherently unsafe, so that we can be assured of confining the Plutonium and other radioactivity in the event of the worst possible LMFBR
accident.
(The foregoing material was submitted to the AEC for comment
Correspondence and comment follow:)
September 25, 1972.
Mr. Robert E. Hollingsworth
General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C.

84 | Thin Safety Margin

Dear Mr. Hollingsworth:
Enclosed is a “Statement on the Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder
Reactor Demonstration Plant” by Richard E. Webb, Ph.D. The Committee is considering the inclusion of this statement in the public
hearing record on the arrangements for construction and operation of
the demonstration liquid metal fast breeder reactor. Please review the
enclosed document and supply the Committee with the Commission’s
comments on it.
Sincerely yours,
Edward J. Bauser
Executive Director
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C., October 25, 1972.
Mr. Edward J. Bauser
Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States
Dear Mr. Bauser:
In accordance with the request in your letter of September 25, 1972,
enclosed is the AEC staff Review of a “Statement on the Liquid Metal
Cooled, Fast Breeder Reactor Demonstration Plant” by Richard E.
Webb, Ph.D.
In its comments the staff addresses mainly Dr. Webb’s views on
breeder reactor safety. . . . Our review indicates that from technical
and legal standpoints the Statement offers no justification for reversing
the AEC’s current plans for designing, constructing and operating the
LMFBR Demonstration Plant.
If we can provide you with any additional information in this
regard, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
John O. Erlewine,
Deputy General Manager
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AEC Staff Review of Dr. R. E. Webb’s Statement on the
LMFBR Demonstration Plant
Safety Issues Pertinent to the LMFBR Demonstration Plant
The Division of Reactor Development and Technology has under
way an extensive base technology and development programs for the
purpose of providing engineering and safety understanding and thus
assuring the success of the LMFBR program objectives, including the
Demonstration Plant. Volume 10 of the LMFBR Program11 covers all
questions relating to the LMFBR Safety program and in particular such
questions as raised by Dr. Webb, which fall in the category of hypothetical accidents and their consequences. In the area of hypothetical
accidents, the safety program has as its objective the understanding
of phenomena related to hypothetical events and their consequences
through the conduct of extensive in-pile and out-of-pile testing as well
as analytical programs which complement the experiments. This understanding will provide realistic bounds and estimates of risk so as to
permit both favorable engineering selection and assessment of risk relative to alternatives and to benefits anticipated. The LMFBR base and
development program will encompass a full consideration of accident
situations. Finally, the construction and the operation of the LMFBR
Demonstration Plant will be subject to the Commission’s regulatory
requirements; as required by law, a permit or license will not issue if the
Commission believes such issuance would be inimical to the health and
safety of the public. The Commission’s regulatory review will, among
other things, be based on the state of the technology at that time, and
on the specific features of the design being considered. Some examples
of work under way in the areas of most concern to Dr. Webb are:
a. In the area of calculational methods for determining the magnitude
of disassembly accidents, Argonne National Laboratory has developed the two-dimensional VENUS reactor disassembly code. This
code takes into consideration autocatalytic reactivity effects such as
fuel motion. The main conclusion from this work so far is that it
takes only a moderate pressure and a very small amount of material
movement to cause the disassembly of a nuclear reactor. Thus during a hypothetical nuclear excursion, the minimum energy and thus
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the generated pressures are limited by the early occurrence of disassembly. This work has been conducted by using the FFTF parameters and characteristics. As can be seen from the referenced LMFBR
Program Plan, work in this area is continuing. Because of the close
coupling of potential safety problems to a particular design, a specific
design (the demonstration plant for example) will be used to bring
into sharp focus the LMFBR safety program, including work in the
area of disassembly accidents of concern to Dr. Webb.
b. The in-pile meltdown tests performed to date in the TREAT reactor
indicate that the mechanical damage potential is less than that which
is thermodynamically possible by two or more orders of magnitude.
		 Dr. Webb uses the EBR-1 incident as a strong justification for his
argument of the autocatalytic nature of fuel element melting. It has
been established that the meltdown of the EBR-I fuel was due to
fuel element bowing which because of the fuel’s structural design
caused a positive coefficient of reactivity. It is this effect that caused
the short period transient in the EBR-I experiment and eventually led
to the meltdown. The postmortem examination of EBR-I indicated
that uranium was expelled from the core. More than half of the uranium which was originally at the core center had been pushed out by
melting to a position near the edge of the core. Therefore, the EBR-I
meltdown incident demonstrated that this phenomenon contributed
to the shutdown of the reactor instead of leading the reactor into a
“runaway” condition as asserted by Dr. Webb. In fact, the importance
of fuel motion as a shutdown mechanism is also evident from recent
analyses (ANL’s SAS and HEDL’s MELT Accident Analysis Codes)
and the results from the in-pile testing in the TREAT reactor.
The following are selected excerpts from Dr. Webb’s rebuttal to the
AEC of July, 1973:12

Rebuttal
The AEC letter forwarding its Staff Review concludes that my Statement “offers no justification for reversing the AEC’s current plans for
designing, constructing and operating the LMFBR Demonstration
Plant.” However, the AEC’s staff review provides no valid basis for this
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conclusion. Indeed, the staff review does not positively deny my allegations. . . .
I will first describe basically how the LMFBR explosion hazard
arises and the main problem to be solved in predicting the explosion
potential. This basic theory will hopefully enable the layman to follow
this evaluation, including my original statement. . . .

The Basic Theory of LMFBR Explosion Hazard
Basically, the LMFBR contains bundles of vertical fuel rods packed
together to form the “core” which produces most of the heat of the reactor. A coolant in the form of liquid metal (sodium) is pumped through
the core to remove the heat and transfer it to the steam-turbine systems
for electricity generation. The coolant passage space within the core
is the narrow space between adjacent fuel rods. In addition, the core
is pierced by non-fuel “control rods,” which are used to control the
nuclear reaction. Surrounding the core is a “blanket” of fertile nuclear
material, again in the form of rods, which is converted to fissionable
fuel (Plutonium) by the “neutron” radiation from the core. (This conversion into fissionable fuel is called “breeding.”)
The explosion hazard arises because of a phenomenon called
“nuclear runaway,” which is an extremely rapid rise and fall in the reactor power to extreme peak levels that yields an explosive burst of energy
before the “nuclear excursion” is terminated. (This is also called a
“power excursion.”) The reactor parameter or quantity that determines
whether a runaway will be triggered is the “reactivity,” and is to be controlled in order to avoid a nuclear runaway. When the reactivity is made
zero, the reactor power level will remain constant; and the reactor is said
to be “critical,” which is the desired condition for normal, steady, fullpower operations. When the reactivity is made positive (increased), but
not too high, the reactor power level will rise at a controllable rate, and
the reactor is said to be “supercritical.” When the reactivity is decreased
to below zero (made negative), the power level will decay or fall; and the
reactor would be said to be “sub-critical.”
But if the reactivity should increase above a threshold level, called
“prompt critical,” then an uncontrollable nuclear runaway will occur,
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which can end in core destruction, and conceivably a disastrous explosion. During the nuclear runaway the reactor is said to be “superprompt-critical.” Again, if the reactivity is below prompt critical, but
still positive (above zero), the power level will rise relatively slow in
a controlled rate due to the action of something called “delayed neutrons,” which need not be described here. (See Appendix C for a deeper
insight.) As we shall see, an unchecked supercritical power transient can
lead to fuel over-heating and then a rise in the reactivity to trigger a
super-prompt-critical power transient, or nuclear runaway.
The reactor “control rods” are the mechanical devices used to control the reactor’s reactivity. They are regulated, or moved in and out
of the core of the reactor (the fuel region), to control the reactivity
during normal operation, in order to control and maneuver the power
level. Control rod withdrawal increases the reactivity, and control rod
insertion decreases the reactivity. The control rods also have a crucial
emergency function to be described shortly.
The mechanisms by which the reactivity is increased in an LMFBR
accident situation are: Fuel compaction, and perhaps something called
fuel “implosion”; control rod withdrawal; and sodium-coolant expulsion or voiding from the interior of the reactor core. The mechanisms
for decreasing the reactivity during an accident are: core expansion;
fuel temperature rise (the Doppler Effect); and control rod insertion.
Increasing, or decreasing, the reactivity is sometimes referred to as
“inserting” positive, or negative, reactivity, as the case may be.
The reactivity is measured in “percent” units. About .35% reactivity is sufficient to make the reactor prompt-critical for an LMFBR
(and about .7% for a water-cooled reactor). In general, a 2% reduction
in the reactor core volume by fuel compaction produces about ½%
positive reactivity (+ ½% reactivity). Conversely, a 2% increase in the
core volume by fuel expansion produces about ½% negative reactivity (- ½% reactivity insertion). Therefore, slight compaction of the
core can render the core super-prompt-critical and trigger a nuclear
runaway, inasmuch as .35% reactivity equals prompt-critical. Due to
the coolant space in the core, the potential for core compaction is
about 50%, and therefore the potential for reactivity insertion is great;
although the reactivity could not increase much beyond +1% without
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causing a disastrous explosion and reversal of the compaction process. Unchecked control rod withdrawal, and sodium expulsion due
to sodium over-heating and boiling, can each add enough reactivity to
cause a nuclear runaway, as well as fuel or core compaction.
It is the slight expansion of the core in response to the build-up of
energy, and hence pressure, during a nuclear runaway that decreases
the reactivity to below prompt-critical so as to terminate the nuclear
runaway. (The Doppler temperature effect assists the core expansion
effect in inserting negative reactivity.) Since the maximum net reactivity in a runaway will be about 1% for disastrous explosions, only the
initial amounts of core expansion (about 1% increase in core volume) is
needed to end even the worst nuclear runaway. If the energy generated
during the runaway (called the “energy yield” or “energy released”) is
strong enough, the core expansion process will take the form of an
explosion. The expansion of the core due to explosion will ultimately
render the reactor permanently subcritical (shutdown), if we can still
call a destroyed reactor a “reactor,” as the core is “disassembled” by the
explosion.
The severity of the nuclear runaway depends in part on the rate
at which the reactivity increases above prompt-critical—i.e., the reactivity insertion rate. A higher rate means that more reactivity can be
“inserted” before expansive pressures build up than the case of a lower
reactivity insertion rate, which in turn means that more expansion is
then required for terminating the runaway. But before the core can
expand and reduce the reactivity, the fuel materials must first accelerate outward, which takes time and, thereby, delays the termination of
the runaway beyond the point in time when the expansive pressures
first appear. This time delay in expansion allows the runaway power
level to continue to increase rapidly, and hence to increase the energy
yield before expansion terminates the runaway. Since a higher reactivity
insertion rate requires more expansion to stop the runaway, this time
delay is lengthened, thereby worsening the energy yield. Any such delay
is dangerous, since the energy yield could very quickly (of the order
of a few millionths of a second) become extremely severe producing a
disastrous explosion. Therefore, a greater reactivity insertion rate means
more core expansion is needed to terminate the runaway, which in turn
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means increased time delay before a termination, which in turn means
a higher energy yield and, ultimately, a greater explosion.
There is, however, another phenomenon besides the initial reactivity
insertion rate on which the severity of an LMFBR nuclear runaway accident depends, and this is called an autocatalytic reactivity effect, which is
the main focus of my concerns for the LMFBR explosion hazard, and is
defined as an increase in the reactivity during or after an initial nuclear
runaway due to some cause which offsets the negative reactivity inserted
by core expansion and the Doppler effect. If autocatalysis occurs, the termination of the nuclear runaway will be delayed, or the runaway could
even be made worse by increasing the reactivity instead of decreasing it
during the runaway; or if the runaway is already terminated, a second
runaway could be triggered. An autocatalytic effect, then, worsens the
total energy yield in an LMFBR accident and the resultant explosion.
The LMFBR has the potential for nuclear runaway and autocatalytic reactivity effects because the core contains so much concentrated
fuel which is not arranged in the most reactive configuration. This is
because the fuel is arranged in bundles of fuel rods (about 0.2 inch
in diameter) which are spaced apart for coolant passage. About 50%
of the initial core volume is taken up by these coolant passages. The
coolant passages, therefore, provide space for fuel compaction. Should
the fuel over heat and melt down or slump, the core can then become
compacted and insert the reactivity to trigger a runaway. Since only 2%
volume reduction can raise the reactivity to prompt critical, and 2%
more can result in a disastrous explosion, we can see the potential ease
for runaway due to core meltdown.
Strictly speaking, any spontaneous rise in the reactivity while below
prompt-critical is also “autocatalytic,” as it produces a worsening power
excursion, and can lead into a nuclear runaway. So, in the strict sense,
any core compaction, implosion, or coolant expulsion that occur upon
core overheating to increase the reactivity spontaneously are autocatalytic effects.
A core overheating and meltdown situation can be created by an
“over-power accident,” which I’ll call a slow power excursion or rise,
short of nuclear runaway, which heats the fuel at a greater rate than
what the reactor coolant can remove; or by a loss-of-cooling accident in
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which the reactor coolant slows down as it passes normally through the
core (due to loss of pumping), or is expelled from the core as it is boiled,
or simply drains through a pipe rupture.
The fuel motion under meltdown can be vigorous as molten and
hot solid fuel is pushed by the boiling, flashing, and exploding sodium
coolant, and other high pressure forces, or as the fuel is acted on by gravity. The fuel motion upon core meltdown then determines the reactivity insertion rate at prompt-critical, which could be severe. Recall that
sodium coolant expulsion due to boiling is another way which reactivity
can be added to trigger a nuclear runaway. Other ways include control
rod ejection and dropping a fuel rod bundle into a critical core during a
refueling operation. These other ways could produce a severe reactivity
insertion rate as well. (Although, it is not clear that a single control rod
ejection by itself could trigger a nuclear runaway; but it could induce a
power excursion, and core meltdown, and then a runaway.)
(Incidentally, the LMFBR core will contain about 250 bundles of
fuel rods, all bunched together; and each bundle will contain about 200
fuel rods, making about 50,000 fuel rods total in the core. The number
of control rods will be about 50, although these are much larger than
a single fuel rod.)
The concern for autocatalytic reactivity effects arises because of
the non-uniform nature of core meltdown and expansion. If the core
were uniform and expanded uniformly as the result of a nuclear runaway, there would be no question but that the expansion would reduce
the reactivity and terminate the runaway without autocatalysis. But
because the expansion process will be highly non-uniform (i.e., the fuel
motion will be haphazard) and because of the large amount of concentrated fuel in an LMFBR (the core contains enough fuel to make
ten to forty separate “critical” reactors if fully compacted), there is the
valid concern that the fuel will, on its way toward overall core expansion, collect in a different super-prompt-critical configuration long
enough (of the order of 5/1000 second) to amplify the initial nuclear
runaway or cause a very severe secondary runaway. These autocatalytic
effects due to fuel motion during or right after a nuclear runaway, then,
become a matter of grave concern. For an initial runaway could add
enough energy to melt the whole core and even vaporize it to explosive
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pressures. Under these conditions, the motion of fuel can conceivably
generate very severe autocatalytic reactivity effects ending in a disastrous explosion. For example, an initial runaway could be terminated
by slight expansion of the core in the initial phase of the explosion.
But because there is so much fuel that is relatively loosely arranged, the
expansion of fuel in one region of the core could conceivably compact
another region of the core and make the overall reactor super-prompt-
critical again. This “explosive compaction” could make the “reactivity
insertion rate” for the second runaway very high, because the reactivity
is rising with explosive fuel velocities, which tends to produce an even
greater runaway. Furthermore, with explosive compaction, the momentum of the fuel would be toward increasing local compaction, and,
therefore, increasing reactivity, delaying the core expansion (shutdown)
process until it can overcome the momentum, which would make the
runaway all the more worse. The process is extremely complicated to
analyze.
A special case of fuel motion is “implosion,” where the fuel in the
core explodes or expands inward or into an inner, hollow cavity that
may have been created in the core upon meltdown. Implosion is neither
compaction, nor overall core expansion; but it can be autocatalytic, as
it tends to bring fuel together, like compaction, and thereby raise the
reactivity. Thus implosion further complicates the calculation of core
behavior in an LMFBR accident to predict whether net autocatalytic
behavior is possible.
The primary purpose of evaluation of LMFBR safety, given in this
rebuttal, is to convey to the layman the extreme complexity involved
in calculating fuel motion under LMFBR accident situations or conditions, and to show that disastrous autocatalytic nuclear runaways due
to fuel motion may very well be possible, and certainly have not been
scientifically investigated, and that the maximum explosion potential
has not therefore been established. That is, it may very well be possible
for an LMFBR to suffer a disastrous nuclear explosion, releasing a large
fraction, if not virtually all, of the core’s Plutonium and fission product
radioactivity into the Environment, as the science of LMFBRs is not
well established in this regard.
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So far, I have but touched on the Doppler effect, which has an
important mitigating effect on the nuclear runaway. This Doppler
effect promptly inserts negative reactivity as the fuel temperature climbs
during the runaway, so as to reduce the reactivity and slow down the
runaway. Without it, the explosion potential of the LMFBR would
unquestionably be too high. However, the reactivity reduction potential
of the Doppler effect is limited to about 1% negative reactivity, which
means that autocatalytic reactivity effects conceivably could override or
nullify the Doppler effect.
Another important aspect of LMFBR accidents is the “reactor
scram” function, which is the rapid insertion of the reactor control
rods to render the core subcritical in an emergency, and thereby avoid
prompt-criticality (i.e., nuclear runaway). The SCRAM, then, shuts
down the reactor so as to ensure against overheating and melting, and
thus core compaction and the resultant nuclear runaway, provided that
the coolant is still present to remove the “decay heat” produced by the
decaying radioactivity that builds up with reactor operation. Failure to
SCRAM upon detection of a core-overheat situation is expected to be
the most probable way in which a nuclear runaway can occur, and the
power level would remain high to effect meltdown or coolant expulsion—the main reactivity rise mechanisms.
However, once the reactor is super-prompt-critical, the control rod
scram function is of no use since the runaway is extremely rapid (lasting
only about 1/1000 of a second), and will be over before the control rods
could be inserted appreciably. Furthermore, once the core melted-down
or exploded, it seems possible that a control rod scram would not be
of any help in preventing secondary nuclear runaways, as (1) the core
could be so distorted as to not permit control rod insertion, since these
rods are fitted into the core with little clearance; (2) the control rods
themselves could be damaged or ejected by the explosion; or (3) the
reactivity rise due to meltdown could override the negative reactivity
“worth” of the control rod scram. In addition, there is the concern
that the core could suffer overheating leading to runaway before being
detected quickly enough for the SCRAM to be initiated in time to
control the situation.
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Finally, it is useful to compare the LMFBR with the commercial
water-cooled nuclear reactor of today—the so-called “light water reactor,” or the LWR. The LMFBR is greatly different than the LWR from a
core meltdown and nuclear runaway standpoint. A large LMFBR has a
much higher “power density in the core at normal, full-power conditions,
by about 10 times (the power density is the power produced in one unit
of core volume); a much greater concentration of fuel; and a much more
rapid nuclear runaway given the same reactivity rise, which is a consequence of the greater fuel concentration and the different reactor coolant.
LWRs have such a low fuel concentration, on the other hand, that they
are not susceptible to nuclear runaway upon fuel meltdown, even if the
fuel were fully compacted, according to Forbes (a point which should be
confirmed). The higher power density means that the LMFBR is all the
more prone to meltdown should the core suffer coolant interruption, and
in that respect is more prone to nuclear runaway. The higher power density means also that the heating due to the intense radioactivity buildup
in the core is greater because the radioactivity is more concentrated. This
heating, called “decay heat,” exists even when the reactor is subcritical,
and can by itself under certain conditions cause meltdown and bring
about nuclear runaway in the LMFBR. (For example, it is conceivable
that the core could be distorted by an explosion such that it would not
be amenable to cooling. Because of the decay heat, the core would melt
down, even if the fission power level were negligible, and trigger a secondary explosion.) Nor does the LMFBR inherently shutdown (become
subcritical) should the core lose its coolant, as is the case for an LWR.
Instead, a reduction of coolant in the LMFBR core can by itself raise the
reactivity and trigger a nuclear runaway as mentioned before; whereas
the LWR requires the presence of the water coolant in the core to make
the reactor critical, because of its low fuel concentration.
In other words the LMFBR has so much fissionable material in concentrated form that it is prone to suffer nuclear runaway and explosion
accidents if the core configuration or condition is perturbed slightly.
Indeed, a mild local perturbation in the core of an LMFBR could
generate a strong enough over-power transient so as to melt down the
entire core and lead to an even stronger nuclear runaway, the bounds of
which have not been scientifically determined. Again my concern for
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autocatalytic reactivity effects is that a core undergoing a nuclear runaway may possibly be capable, during an early phase of the explosion, of
either compacting or imploding part of its fuel so as to amplify the initial nuclear runaway or to trigger stronger secondary nuclear runaways
that end in a disastrous explosion. Core explosion is given the name
“core disassembly,” although this term could imply relatively nonviolent
core disruption or expansion as well. Core disassembly is the reverse of
compaction or implosion and eventually stops the nuclear runaway by
virtue of the fact that the fuel is blown apart so that it can no longer
sustain an atomic fission chain reaction to generate energy. But, if the
energy created by the runaway is great enough, the disassembly would
occur explosively. It is crucial to predict the fuel motion during the accident to determine whether the fuel will implode or compact in an autocatalytic manner, or whether the fuel disassembles permanently without
chance for re-assembly into a critical mass, and runaway, later on.
Complicating a prediction of the motion of fuel, and thus the
strength of nuclear explosions (I shall use the term “nuclear explosion”
to denote the combination of the nuclear runaway and the explosion
which follows.), is the existence of a myriad of different pressure sources,
such as sodium coolant boiling, which can itself be explosive, gaseous
by-products of the fission process, and fuel vapor and other effects, all of
which are inter-related and dependent on the conditions of the reactor
at the onset of trouble. These complications, plus the difficulty in predicting theoretically whether autocatalytic reactivity effects due to the
complicated fuel motion can occur, and then confirming the theoretical
predictions experimentally, is the central problem which my Statement,
and this Rebuttal of the AEC’s comments, address.
Finally, we present Appendix C of Dr. Webb’s rebuttal to the AEC.
Webb suggested (in his rebuttal remarks above) it be referred to “for a
deeper insight.” It appears that Appendix C would still be lying in a
drawer at the NRC had we not searched for the record of his submittal remarks to the AEC. In our opinion, Webb’s Appendix C may well
be the most concise, accurate, and sober description of the potential
explosion risks associated with fast-breeder reactors that is suitable for
consideration by the public today.

96 | Thin Safety Margin

Appendix C of Webb’s Rebuttal
Basic Theory of LMFBR Nuclear Runaway in More Detail
A nuclear power reactor, such as an LMFBR, generates energy or heat
for eventual electric power production by the fissioning (splitting) of
uranium and plutonium fuel atoms. This fissioning is caused by the
interaction of fuel atoms with small atomic particles, “neutrons,” which
fly around inside the reactor at great speeds. When a neutron strikes the
nucleus of a fuel atom, it is likely to be absorbed and cause the atom to
fission. The number of fuel atoms in the core is extremely large; and only
a tiny fraction of these are fissioned in one second. Numerically, one ton
of fuel in a large 1000 MW LMFBR is made up of about 2 x 10 27 atoms,
i.e., 2 thousand trillion trillion atoms. In one second our 1000 MW
LMFBR will fission 3 x 10 19 fuel atoms, or 3 billion trillion atoms.
Hence to fission all of the fuel atoms in a ton of fuel in our 1000 MW
LMFBR would require 2 x 10 27 ÷ 3 x 1019 = 2/3 x 10 8 seconds (67 million seconds), or about 3 years. Therefore, when I speak of fissioning,
extremely large numbers are involved, even though I might refer to one
or a thousand fissions. Likewise, large numbers of neutrons are involved.
Each fission, besides releasing the sought after energy, releases several neutrons (2.5 neutrons per fission on the average), which are then
available to carry on the process through the next fission cycle in order
to sustain the fissioning rate (power level) in the reactor. However, since
only one of the released neutrons is needed for the “next fission,” 1.5
neutrons per fission are extra, the difference between 2.5 and 1.0. But
as we shall see next, these extra neutrons are lost to the system either
by leakage or non-fissionable absorption, except for slight imbalances
which give rise to power level transients, which can be slow or extremely
rapid, as in an explosive nuclear runaway.
Because of the finite size of the batch of fuel in the reactor, which
is called the “reactor core,” a fraction of the neutrons produced by fission are lost due to leakage—i.e., some neutrons escape the core and
never return to cause fissions. Because, too, non-fuel materials exist
in the core which absorb neutrons, such as structural materials and
Uranium-238, used to dilute the fuel, some of the neutrons are absorbed
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without causing fission. The result of the size and non-fuel effects is a
competition between losses (leakage and absorption) and gains (fission
neutrons). When these competing factors are balanced, the fission rate
or power level is constant, and the reactor is said to be “critical.” In
general, whenever fissionable material in a critical reactor is brought
closer together (fuel compaction), the chances for the neutrons striking
fuel atoms and causing fission, rather than leaking out of the core, will
improve; and the neutron balance in the fission cycle tips in favor of
excess neutrons available for fissioning. The extra neutrons then produce fissions which in turn produce extra neutrons, and so on as the fission-neutron cycle repeats. The result is a growing neutron population
and a growing fissioning rate, and hence an increasing reactor power
level. In this condition the reactor is said to be “supercritical.” In the
reverse case, when fuel expands (fuel moving apart), the neutron leakage increases; and then the neutron balance tips the other way, causing
the power level to decay, since less than one neutron released per fission
on the average is available to sustain the next fission. In this condition
the reactor is said to be “subcritical.”
The percentage difference between the number of neutrons available
for fissioning and the number needed to sustain the fissioning rate at a
constant level is a crucial parameter called the “reactivity.” Therefore,
when the reactivity is positive, the fissioning rate grows and the reactor
is supercritical; and when the reactivity is negative, the fissioning rate
decays, and the reactor is subcritical. Thus, fuel compaction increases the
reactivity, and fuel expansion decreases the reactivity. When the reactivity is
zero, the reactor is critical. As we shall see, +1% reactivity is very strong.
There is another kind of neutron balance involving the time scale,
and concerns the controllability of reactor power level increases. Foremost is the “neutron lifetime,” which is the time period between the
release of neutrons from one set of fissions until these fission neutrons
cause the next set of fissions (a fission cycle). The neutron lifetime is
extremely short in an LMFBR—about .0000001 seconds, or one-tenth
of a millionth of a second, due mainly to the fast speeds of the neutrons,
which is why the LMFBR, Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, is called
a “fast” reactor—meaning a fast neutron reactor. If this is all there were
to fission-physics, then once a reactor was made slightly supercritical, it
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would quickly runaway with an uncontrollable burst of energy. In order
to appreciate this, assume that a large 1000 megawatt LMFBR was critical at a feeble power level of 1/100 watt, which would be .00000000001
of the reactor’s designed full-power level. Then assume the reactor is
made supercritical by a slight compaction of the fuel so that the reactivity is increased to +.5%. (Roughly, a 2% reduction in reactor core
volume by core compaction adds .5% of positive reactivity. Potentially,
the core volume could be reduced by about 50% by compaction; but as
we shall see, a nuclear runaway would explode the core before it could
be compacted very much past a 2% volume reduction). A reactivity of
.5% means that the number of fissions per cycle would increase by .5%
with the passage of each neutron lifetime (i.e., from one fission cycle to
the next fission cycle). This means that the number of fissions occurring
per cycle increases, not at a steady rate, but at progressively increasing
rate (i.e., “exponentially”). This is because the number of fissions in
one cycle is .5% greater than the number of fissions in the immediately
preceding fission cycle, and not .5% of the number of fissions in the
first cycle after the reactivity was raised above zero. That is, the increase
between successive fission cycles is .005 times the current number of
fissions occurring per cycle. Since the increase per cycle gets larger when
the current number of fissions per cycle gets larger, the growth rate of fissioning accelerates, instead of staying constant, as time progresses.
As an illustration, let us assume that the cycle produced 1000 fissions, and then compare the case of steady-rise with the exponentialrise after 10, 100, 300, 1000, and 2000 cycles, respectively, given the
.5% reactivity. The following table illustrates the difference between
the two cases.
Number of Fissions Occurring in the “Nth” Cycle
Nth Cycle
Steady Rise
Exponential Rise
1st
1,000
1,000
10th
1,050
1,051
100th
1,500
1,650
300th
2,500
4,500
1,000th
6,000
143,000
2,000th
11,000
20,500,000
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From the table we see that there is little difference in the first 100
cycles. However, the number of fissions per cycle in the exponential case
begins to get progressively greater than the steady-rise case, until past
the 1000th cycle when the exponential rise “runs away.” This process
happens extremely quick in time because of the short neutron lifetime
(time period of the fission cycle). For example, there are 50,000 fission
cycles in just one-thousandth of a second, or millisecond, which allows
a tremendous growth in fissioning in a very short interval of time.
Let us now ask what would be the power level and energy generated
after our hypothetical reactor was supercritical at .5% reactivity for one
millisecond. The answer is that the power level would grow, if it were not
controlled by core expansion (and fuel burn-up) to 500 billion times the
1000 megawatt full-power level designed for the reactor, starting with
only a feeble 1/100 of a watt; and the energy generated during the millisecond would be 100 billion megawatt-seconds, roughly equivalent to a
25 megaton nuclear weapon explosion. Actually, the heat generated early
during the transient would create pressures within the fuel to expand
the fuel, which decreases the reactivity to a negative value. (Just as the
fission rate grows exponentially when the reactivity is positive, the fission
rate decays exponentially when the reactivity is negative. Therefore, when
the reactivity is negative, the power level will quickly decay to a feeble
level with the same rapidity as the runaway rise in power level.) This
expansion, therefore, affects the reactivity, and the course of the runaway,
and must be taken into account. When it is, an LMFBR under a .5%
reactivity runaway (and no Doppler feedback) will produce an explosion
of the order of 1000 lbs. TNT equivalent, excluding autocatalytic reactivity effects, according to estimates. This negative reactivity effect due to
expansion thus terminates the runaway, limiting it to a much less violent
explosion—about 1000 lbs. TNT equivalent for the assumed reactivity
condition in an LMFBR. This phenomenon of exponential growth of
the fission rate is called a “nuclear runaway,” which can produce a burst
of explosive energy.
Given such hypothetical reactor behavior, the reactor would
not be controllable, since a slight increase in the reactivity, which a
reactor operator would normally want to make in order to raise the
power level from shutdown to full power level, for example, would
lead instantly (within a millisecond) to reactor destruction before the
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control equipment could respond. This is because the mechanical reactor control equipment couldn’t make the super-fine changes in reactivity that would be needed to raise the reactor power level at a controlled
rate for our hypothetical reactor. That is, the nuclear runaway would
be over within a millisecond, before the control rods would move any
appreciable amount.
Fortunately, for control purposes, a small fraction of the fissionreleased neutrons (about .3% to .7%) in a real reactor do not appear
promptly with the fissions, but are emitted by the fission fragments with
about a one second delay. The fraction of the fission neutrons which
are delayed is called the “delayed neutron fraction.” If a reactor was
made supercritical, but with the reactivity kept below the delayed neutron
fraction, the delayed neutrons would have the effect of suppressing the
growth rate of the fissioning, enabling one to control the reactor. To
understand why, consider again our hypothetical supercritical reactor
with no delayed neutrons.
With the reactivity positive, there would be more fission-released
neutrons to cause further fissioning than would be needed to sustain the
fission rate at a constant level. But by not being delayed, the extra neutrons would cause the extra fissioning within the short neutron lifetime.
Hence, the fission rate would rise extremely rapidly in an exponential,
runaway fashion. But if the extra neutrons were delayed by about one
second, then the extra fissioning, caused by these extra neutrons, would
be correspondingly delayed. The result is that the fissioning rate, or reactor power level, in a real reactor would grow slowly, over the time scale
of seconds instead of 1/10 of a millionth of a second (i.e., instead of in
the runaway fashion, if the reactivity is less than the delayed neutron
fraction). In this state the reactor is still said to be “supercritical.” This
neutron delay, then, provides enough time for the reactor control system
to maneuver the power level during normal operation. When the desired
power level is reached, the reactivity is returned to zero, so that the reactor will be made critical—i.e., producing power at a constant level.
However, if the reactivity is raised to exceed the delayed neutron fraction, then there will be an excess of prompt neutrons available for extra
fissioning. The growth of fissioning will then occur over the short time
period of the “neutron lifetime,” instead of over a long delayed period.
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Hence, when the reactivity exceeds the delayed neutron fraction (about
.35% in an LMFBR), a nuclear runaway will ensue in the fashion of
our “hypothetical” reactor previously discussed. In this runaway condition, the reactor is then said to be “super-prompt-critical.” When the
reactivity equals the delayed neutron fraction, the reactor is said to be
“prompt critical,” which is the threshold for nuclear runaway. The crux
of reactor control is to keep the reactivity below prompt critical, or else an
explosive nuclear runaway will occur. But this is not always possible, as
an accident could make the reactor super-prompt-critical.
Next, we shall summarize the phenomena which can change the
reactivity, as these reactivity effects are crucial to the control and the
accident behavior of the LMFBR. These phenomena are as follows:
• Reducing the neutron leakage increases the reactivity.
This is accomplished by bringing fuel together (compacting fuel
or adding more fuel) so that the neutrons have a better chance of
interaction with the fuel atoms, rather than being lost due to leakage. A special case of compaction is implosion; e.g., when the fuel
explodes into a hollow, interior cavity, while being essentially confined from exploding outward. A fuel meltdown could produce core
compaction.
• Increasing the neutron leakage decreases reactivity.
This is accomplished by moving fuel apart: expansion as with explosion; fuel falling away from the core; or fuel from the core being
removed mechanically or carried away by the flowing coolant.
• Increasing the neutron absorption by non-fuel material decreases reactivity; conversely, reducing such absorption increases reactivity.
This phenomenon is used to control the reactor once enough fuel
is assembled to make the reactor critical. The control is effected by
inserting or withdrawing “control rods” into and out of the reactor
core. These control rods are made of non-fuel, neutron-absorbing
material. Thus inserting them into the core robs neutrons that would
otherwise cause fission, and thereby, decreases the reactivity. Withdrawing the control rods reduces the non-fuel absorption of neutrons
and increases the neutrons available for fissioning, and thus increases
the reactivity. In general, the reactor is designed so that the neutron
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balance is achieved when the control rods are withdrawn to the “critical height” position that is part way out of the core. When the control
rods are withdrawn to this height, the reactor will be critical. Further
withdrawal will make the reactivity positive, and the reactor will be
supercritical. If the control rods are withdrawn too far, the reactivity can increase beyond the delayed neutron fraction, and the reactor
will be made super-prompt-critical, and then a nuclear runaway will
ensue. These control rods are regulated so as to raise and lower the
reactor power level for normal operation while keeping the reactivity
below prompt critical. Also, as the fuel “burns-up” with use (each fission destroys a fuel atom), the reactivity would tend to become negative
(i.e., make the reactor subcritical) since fuel burn-up has the effect of
removing fuel. (A subcritical reactor could not produce power because
the power level would decay to practically zero.) To compensate for this
burn-up effect, the control rods are withdrawn slowly over the period of
months as the fuel is depleted to keep the reactor critical and producing power. The fuel will continue to be depleted with reactor operation
until the control rods are fully withdrawn from the core, in which case
the reactor power level could not be sustained for normal operations
(end of life), and the reactor would have to be “refueled.” However, if
the reactor suffered fuel meltdown in the “end-of-life” condition, there
is still the reactivity rise potential due to core compaction and, therefore, the potential for nuclear runaway accidents. The control rods also
have a crucial safety function. In the event that the reactor should reach
a dangerous reactivity condition (near prompt critical) the “protection
system” is designed to rapidly insert or “scram” the control rods to render the reactor subcritical. This safety action is called “reactor scram.”
• Increasing the fuel temperature decreases the reactivity.
This is an inherent safety mechanism called “Doppler feedback,” which
is being designed into LMFBR’s in the United States. It is designed to
act during a nuclear runaway to limit the energy burst, when a control rod scram would be too slow to have any mitigating effect. More
specifically, as the temperature rapidly increases in the fuel during a
nuclear runaway, the Doppler effect promptly subtracts reactivity to
slow the runaway and, in some mild runaway cases, can render the
reactor safely subcritical until the control rod scram can permanently
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shut down the reactor without the generation of excessive temperatures (i.e., explosive pressures). However, in most runaway accidents,
the source of the initial reactivity increase which caused the runaway
will persist to override the negative Doppler reactivity. Other sources
of positive reactivity may occur as well. So Doppler feedback is not
sufficient to stop most accidents. Also, the Doppler reactivity reduction potential is limited practically to about 1% of negative reactivity.
Thus Doppler is not enough to cope with the potential for accidental
positive reactivity addition. (The negative reactivity of overall core
expansion is being counted on as the main shutdown mechanism
for terminating a nuclear runaway.) The chief role of the Doppler,
then, is to slow down the nuclear runaway long enough to enable the
expansion process and make subcritical. This mitigating effect of the
Doppler can be strong.
• Sodium coolant (liquid metal) expulsion from the core can increase or
decrease reactivity, depending on which regions of the core are made
devoid of coolant.
This effect is due to a trade-off between increased neutron leakage and increased neutron absorption by the fuel when coolant is
“voided” from the core. The net reactivity change can be positive if
the sodium coolant is expelled (voided) from the inner regions of the
core, where neutron leakage from the core is lowest.
Having now described the basic reactivity change mechanisms, let
us learn how these mechanisms can be called into play in an LMFBR
accident to bring about a nuclear runaway and explosion.
The fuel in the LMFBR is arranged in bundles of fuel rods spaced
somewhat apart for coolant passage (heat removal). Therefore the fuel
is not arranged in its most reactive state, since the coolant passages
provide space for fuel compaction. However, the reactor fuel rods are
designed to be fairly rigid so that they won’t bow inward or slump
(compact) during normal operations and add excessive reactivity.
However, if the fuel should over-heat, either by unchecked control rod
withdrawal, which adds reactivity and causes the power level to rise to
excessive levels, or by a loss-of-coolant, the fuel will melt, lose its rigidity, and could then collapse onto itself as the molten fuel moves into
the coolant passage space. The result of core meltdown, then, could be
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core compaction, which can cause an excessive rise in reactivity. Keep
in mind that it takes only slight compaction to raise the reactivity to
prompt critical—about 2% volume reduction of the core; and then
slightly more compaction to trigger the nuclear runaway. That is, slight
fuel movement either way can have either a serious positive reactivity
effect, or a strong negative reactivity, shutdown effect. Actually, after
the reactor has operated a while, intense radioactivity builds up, so
that even if the reactor was made subcritical and the fission power level
dropped to feeble levels, the heat from the decaying radioactivity called
“decay heat,” which is substantial, will persist. This decay heating can
by itself melt the fuel and could bring about core compaction.
Besides fuel meltdown, sodium coolant voiding can trigger a
nuclear runaway as well. For example, a loss-of-coolant flow accident or
over-power accident can lead to coolant overheating, boiling, and then
expulsion or voiding of the coolant from the core. This sodium voiding
can then add reactivity past prompt critical to produce a nuclear runaway. This is an example of autocatalytic behavior, where an LMFBR
accident feeds itself a dose of positive reactivity by overheating to produce a nuclear runaway, which then worsens the accident.
The central concern in LMFBR accident analyses is the behavior
of the reactivity during the accident. From the foregoing it is clear that
besides coolant voiding we must be able to accurately predict fuel motion
during an LMFBR accident situation to determine whether the explosion process itself can compact part of the core to a sufficient degree to
increase the reactivity before overall core expansion permanently renders
the reactor subcritical or shutdown. If sufficient fuel compaction occurs
during an explosion to offset the negative reactivity due to Doppler and
overall core expansion, then the net reactivity can increase, instead of
decrease during the nuclear runaway, and the runaway will become
worse (faster), instead of being terminated; or if the nuclear runaway
had already been terminated, a second one could occur. As we’ve seen at
the outset, the energy can build up very quickly to dangerous, explosive
levels when the nuclear runaway condition is prolonged. The behavior
of the reactor when reactivity rises instead of falls during the accident is
called “autocatalytic,” meaning that the core is its own catalyst—speeding up its own fission reaction rate. Conceivably, autocatalytic reactivity
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effects could even exhaust the Doppler negative reactivity effect, which
would make an explosion all the more severe. Eventually, however,
overall core expansion (explosion) would take over and drive the core
subcritical. The question is, though, how much energy can the nuclear
runaway(s) generate before being finally terminated—the energy being
then correlated with the size of the resultant explosion.
The energy yield of an LMFBR nuclear runaway accident, which is
the measure of the force of the explosion, is related to the rate at which
the reactivity rises above prompt critical, i.e., the “reactivity insertion
rate.” If the rate is low, the nuclear runaway will proceed less rapidly
than otherwise, giving the fuel material time to accelerate outward
(expand) and provide the offsetting negative reactivity before too much
reactivity builds up to generate a stronger runaway. If the rate of reactivity increase is high, then more reactivity can be “inserted” before
the expansion occurs, and a stronger runaway occurs. Remember, it
takes time for fuel material to accelerate and expand, which allows for
reactivity insertion. Initial meltdown events are characterized by upper
limits of reactivity insertion rates of about 200% per second, which
when mitigated by the Doppler effect, yields the 500 lb. TNT-order
explosion, assuming no autocatalysis. But autocatalytic reactivity effects
such as explosive compaction could conceivably yield insertion rates
in excess of 1000% per second. Therefore, fuel motion is the primary
object of study in LMFBR analyses, and must be fully understood to
establish the maximum explosion potential of the LMFBR.
Complicating the nuclear runaway problem is the amount of fuel
concentrated in an LMFBR, which is enough to make somewhere
between 10 to 40 separate critical reactors, if the fuel is fully compacted
(fully dense). Thus for example a nuclear runaway could be terminated
by slight expansion of core materials during the initial phase of a nuclear
runaway explosion, only to compact enough fuel later on to return the
core, or a part of it, to super-prompt-critical; i.e., to trigger secondary nuclear runaways. However, with explosive compaction, the rate at
which the reactivity would increase would be great, and the momentum
of the compacting fuel would have to be overcome, which delays the
shutdown reactivity and conceivably could enable the runaway to grow
to very dangerous levels.
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These factors, then, make explosive compaction a matter of grave
concern. (Indeed, the atomic bomb is produced by explosive compaction [the compaction is affected by detonating a TNT charge].)
Whether an LMFBR can be made to explode like an atomic bomb
is a question I honestly don’t know the answer for. All I can say is
that I have seen no analyses which rule out the possibility; and that
I’m prevented from learning the physics of the atomic bomb, since the
information is kept secret. My best judgment, though, is that the worst
autocatalytic nuclear runaway in an LMFBR would not produce an
atomic-bomb-like explosion, but that it may produce a severe enough
explosion to “blow-up” the reactor and allow the escape of the radioactivity to the environment (the worst conceivable LMFBR explosions
mentioned in this rebuttal range from 500 lb. TNT equivalent to the
order of 20,000 lb. TNT, which compares with a 20,000 tons of TNT
equivalent for the first A-bomb).
It is useful to compare the commercial, water-cooled reactors now
being operated—the so-called light water reactors (LWRs)—with the
LMFBR. The concentration of fissionable fuel in an LMFBR core is
much greater than the LWR. In fact, the LWR fuel concentration is
so low that without the water coolant, the fuel probably cannot be
made critical even if the fuel is fully compacted. It turns out that
the LWR fuel can only be made critical if the fuel is spaced apart
in the form of fuel rods with water in between. Unlike the sodium
coolant in an LMFBR, the water in an LWR greatly slows down the
neutrons, which are released at high speeds by the fissioning. A slow
neutron has a much better chance for splitting atoms than a fast neutron. Hence, a lesser fuel concentration is needed in an LWR. But
if the water coolant should be expelled or drained from the core of
an LWR, the reactor would be rendered subcritical, since the fission
neutrons could not be slowed down, and without the slow neutrons
the low fuel concentration could not sustain the fissioning. In contrast, the loss-of-coolant accident in an LWR presents the danger of
a core meltdown, and the associated possible disaster of the built-up
radioactivity escaping to the environment (due to the meltdown causing a breach in the reactor container). But because the LWR has a low
fuel concentration, it does not have nearly the reactivity or nuclear
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runaway problem associated with fuel meltdown or coolant expulsion
in an LMFBR.
Further, the Doppler effect is stronger in the LWR, and the neutron
lifetime is longer by a factor 1000. These facts make a nuclear runaway
in an LWR less severe compared to an LMFBR for the same initial
reactivity condition. (However, the LWR still has a serious potential
for nuclear runaway; but this fact is beyond the scope of this LMFBR
safety review.) Finally, the LMFBR has a power density in the core that
is about ten times higher than that of an LWR. The power density
is the amount of heat (power) generated in a given volume of core.
This higher power density means that core meltdown occurs more vigorously, should adequate cooling be lost, than in an LWR. Also, the
“decay heat” in an LMFBR is correspondingly stronger, which makes
core meltdown worse than in an LWR without adequate cooling. This
decay heat is troublesome for a number of reasons, one of which is that
even if the LMFBR had shutdown (subcritical) after suffering a meltdown, the fuel might freeze into an uncoolable mass, which could soon
melt again, generating the possibility of re-assembly back into a “critical
mass” and nuclear runaway.
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Tickling the SEFOR Dragon

Between the time at which positive reactivity is inserted and control
rods begin to move, the reactor behavior depends primarily on the
Doppler effect to limit the severity of the accident.
The integrated negative Doppler reactivity from operating power
level to the point of fuel rupture is required to be large compared to
credible outside sources of rapid reactivity insertion.
. . . Accidents in which the control system does not function are
considered hypothetical. In such accidents, the core will be destroyed,
and the question of primary interest is the containability of the
accompanying energy release.
K. P. Cohen, General Electric Company

It is, in our view, unlikely that one will be able to design for the
worst accident permitted by the laws of nature and end up with
an economically interesting system, even after extensive additional
research and development has been carried out.
P. M. Murphy, General Electric Company

As K. P. Cohen and P. M. Murphy were two of General Electric Company’s principal officers in charge of the LMFBR program, it appears
that GE had no illusions about the risks that the SEFOR project
involved. SEFOR was an experimental reactor; it was never intended
to suggest a reactor design that would be an “economically interesting
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system.” The scientists and engineers at GE appear to have designed it
with three principal performance features in mind:
• As there were a number of ways that positive (or negative) reactivity could be added to the reactor core by intention or accidentally,
SEFOR was designed to minimize the potential for all known positive
and negative reactivity additions save two: a planned intentional positive reactivity addition that could be accurately controlled in magnitude and limited to a specified time period, and the theory-predicted
Doppler effect negative reactivity provided by the plutonium-oxide
fuel. These design features were required to eliminate, as carefully as
possible, all of the effects of reactivity changes in the core, save these
two, in order to allow an accurate measurement of the Doppler effect.
• The reactor was designed so that a highly controlled and accurately
specified amount of positive reactivity could be “inserted” into the
fuel core. This task was performed with the Fast Reactivity Excursion Device (FRED).1
• The design was intended to minimize the possibility that the positive
reactivity intentionally added to the reactor could exceed the amount
of inherent negative reactivity that was predicted to occur due to the
Doppler effect. This feature was critical; the design sought to ensure
that the positive reactivity added could not override the negative
reactivity provided by the Doppler effect.
The primary goal of the SEFOR program was to quantitatively
demonstrate the Doppler effect without suffering a damaging explosion. A principal design goal was to ensure that the fuel temperature
increase that would result from the planned reactivity addition would
not result in any fuel melting.

Reactivity Effects Important in the SEFOR Experiments
Reactivity: The excess (positive or negative) in the number of
neutrons produced per neutron lost during an average lifetime
in a fast reactor—about one 10-millionth of a second.2
• The primary fission reaction of plutonium results in “splitting” of the
239 isotope into two parts with the production (typically) of either
two or three neutrons.
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• The fission of one atom generates 207.1 million electron-volts, or
0.00000000003318 joules of energy.
• 1 gram of plutonium contains about 2.52 billion trillion atoms.
• 1 gram of plutonium fissioned produces, if neutron production
per fission is assumed to be exactly two, 2.52 billion trillion (new)
neutrons—accompanied by an energy release of approximately
20 tons (40,000 pounds) of TNT. It follows that 1 kilogram of
plutonium fissioned releases energy equivalent to approximately
20,000 tons of TNT (Nagasaki bomb yield).
• During normal reactor operation, a slight excess of neutrons is produced by fission above the combined number of neutrons that are
absorbed by the fuel or lost through the surface of the fuel. This
“reactivity” determines the chain-fission-reaction rate in the fuel.
• Depending on the type of reactor, the excess neutrons can be of two
general types: slow and fast; the former having velocities (on average)
of approximately 2 km/s (~4,500 miles per hour) and the latter having velocities (on average) thousands of times higher.
• The reactor is normally controlled by adjusting (inserting or removing) neutron-absorbing “rods” that effect a reduction or increase as
necessary in the reactivity to maintain the desired operating power
level (number of fissions per unit time).
• So-called “transient” increases in reactivity, which can be caused by
normal variations in the chain reaction rate as well as by accidental
occurrences, are normally automatically controlled by positioning
slow-acting control rods in the reactor fuel or, as in SEFOR, positioning a reflector “curtain” surrounding the reactor core.
• If accidental increases in reactivity occur beyond these “normal”
increases, a separate, automatic, fast-acting SCRAM control system
is provided to shut the reactor down before the core is damaged by
overheating.
• If the number of fast neutrons in the core become sufficient to maintain the reactor fuel in a supercritical reactive condition (fissioning
by fast neutrons only), such “prompt” neutron chain reaction rates
can increase by a factor of several thousand, producing nuclear fission bomb explosion intensities.
• In the event that such a “super-prompt-critical” condition is reached,
the only resort is to SCRAM as quickly as possible.

112 | Thin Safety Margin

• Enter the Doppler effect. The Doppler effect, a prompt-negativereactivity-effect, was designed into the SEFOR reactor by using (as
fuel) the oxide of plutonium, rather than pure metal plutonium as
normally required for nuclear weapons explosion yields. The Doppler prompt-negative-reactivity addition occurs as the temperature
of the fuel increases; if sufficiently strong, the Doppler effect will
slow (cancel out) a positive super-prompt-critical reactivity addition,
providing critical time for movement of the SCRAM rods.
Quoting GE’s Dr. Cohen: “The integrated negative Doppler reactivity from operating power level to the point of fuel rupture is required
to be large compared to credible outside sources of rapid reactivity
insertion,” and, “Accidents in which the control system does not function are considered hypothetical. In such accidents, the core will be
destroyed, and the question of primary interest is the containability of
the accompanying energy release.”
In lay terms, Cohen’s statements mean that the amount of explosive
“reactivity” introduced into the reactor core must, at a minimum, be
sufficiently compensated for by the amount of reactivity removed by
the Doppler effect in order to prevent the fuel temperature reaching its
melting point. The fuel melting point limit is to be avoided to obviate
the possibility that melting could alter its spatial arrangement in such
a way as to cause the reactivity to increase as a result of autocatalytic
effects discussed by Dr. Webb in chapter 5. Finally, Cohen is stating
that if the Doppler effect is not sufficiently strong to effectively cancel
the positive reactivity addition, the only result is to activate the emergency SCRAM system. If the emergency SCRAM does not function in
these circumstances, the core will be destroyed, and the question of primary interest is whether the containment provided for the reactor can
withstand the energy released to prevent failure of the containment—
resulting in a worst-case accident that could cause massive releases of
radioactivity to the environment.

The What If Question
We repeat the statement from chapter 2 that considered SEFOR Prompt
Critical Transient Experiment No. 6 conducted during the last week of
December 1971.
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If, in Test No. 6, the increase in SEFOR’s power level caused by
the positive reactivity insertion had not hesitated (as predicted
by the Doppler effect); if the reactivity insertion had been
accidentally maintained longer than the planned 0.1-second
duration; and if the SCRAM procedure had failed—there was
the real possibility that the power level might have increased to
levels with the potential to rupture the containment.
We note that Test No. 6 left two critical questions unanswered:
• The experiments did not address the potential hazard of nuclear
explosions that might be possible if sufficiently large amounts of
prompt-critical reactivity were “inserted” into the core by accident
or as a result of natural disaster that could override the Doppler
effect. Dr. Webb’s principal concern, the possibility of unpredictable
autocatalytic reactivity additions, was not addressed.
• The possibility of such autocatalytic effects occurring made all the
more critical the reliability of the SCRAM mechanisms provided for
the reactor. It appears that the reliability of the SCRAM mechanism
was effectively assumed.
During the last year given to drafting this book, while continuing
research into the general subject of nuclear safety regulation and fast
nuclear reactor safety science, we found the following statement written
by Dr. David Okrent, now deceased. Dr. Okrent was a leading authority on nuclear safety research and regulation and long-term influential
member of the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards:
The Staff report references various experts who have estimated
an unreliability of SCRAM from 10-3 to 10-4 per demand. At
the ACRS Subcommittee meeting on August 26, 1970, General
Electric stated that experience with GE reactors led to a failure
probability of 8 x 10-4 with a 95% probability. It was stated that
to demonstrate empirically an unreliability of 10-7, approximately 300,000 reactor years with a zero failure history would
be required. . . . In fact, during the recent past, another failure
has actually been experienced at Hanford and a partial failure
at SEFOR thereby reinforcing the Staff position.3
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The SEFOR SCRAM System
SEFOR was controlled by movable radial reflector segments that
surrounded the reactor core outside of the reactor vessel. The reflector was divided into ten segments that could be raised or lowered
vertically to give the desired control. Reflector control was feasible
in SEFOR because the core was relatively small with a large radial
neutron leakage component (about 21% of all neutrons). This type
of control was desirable for SEFOR for several reasons, the primary
one probably being maximum safety during the super-prompt-critical
experiments that were a part of the planned experimental program—
placing the primary reactor control and shutdown system in a less
vulnerable location outside of the reactor vessel provided an added
margin of safety.
The 6-inch-thick, 34-inch-high nickel alloy cylindrical reflector
was divided by radial cuts into equal sectors. Each sector comprises the
active portion which was raised and positioned by its drive between the
core and the poison blanket that surrounded it.
The reactor was scrammed by simultaneously dropping the reflector segments to a position that placed them below the bottom edge of
the core.
The reflector guide extended from the top of the core down to the
ceiling of the drive cell. It was composed of two concentric shells joined
by radial webs that supported the segment guide rails and formed the
channel within which the reflector segments were moved.
Two types of drive mechanisms were used to position and scramcontrol the reflector segments, two for fine and the other eight for coarse
control. The coarse control drive normally fixed its control rod at either
end of its stroke, although the rod segment could be interrupted at
any intermediate point. The fine drive was continuously and accurately
positionable throughout its stroke.

The SEFOR Partial SCRAM Event
Quoting from the SEFOR Sixth Quarterly Plant Operation Report:4
Reactor operation at Five MW for Test Procedure Group III,
Static Tests was in progress. Tests with main primary and main
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secondary flow rates of 800 gpm had been completed and the
main secondary flow rate was being increased by movement of the
flow controller setpoint when a reactor scram occurred at 1355 on
September 12, 1970. (emphasis added) Main secondary flow at
the time of scram was approximately 1400 gpm. Flow fluctuations were about +/-25 gpm. The reflectors dropped approximately 5 cm, carriage separation occurred on the fine drives,
power dropped to approximately 3 MW, when an automatic
scram reset occurred. An annunciator alarm and the scram
event recorder indicated “Low Flow Main Secondary.” No other
event was recorded or observed before or during the scram.
The operator immediately pushed the manual scram button,
and the scram was completed. A low pressure freon header trip
had been inserted previously in the safety system since one
freon unit was not required for the 5 MW operation. The short
duration trip from the low flow-main secondary completed
the two-out-of-three logic for scram. Subsequent investigation
revealed that the main contacts on the K1 (scram solenoid)
contactor were opening a noticeable time before the “Holdin” (or auxiliary) contacts (through which the contactor coil
current flows). With this relative opening of contacts on the
contactor, if a trip signal consisting of a short duration pulse
were received by the scram relay (mercury wetted contacts
with time to open of 3 to 4 milliseconds), the voltage could be
removed from the scram bus, the main contacts could open,
the scram bus voltage restored, and the main contacts reclosed
before the auxiliary contacts opened. Measurements on the 12
contactors in the Safety System with an ohmmeter revealed
that in 9 of the contactors the auxiliary contacts opened after
the main contacts.

Notes
1. GEAP-13649, Design and Testing of the Sefor Fast Reactivity Excursion Device
(FRED), AEC Research and Development Report, January 1, 1970.
2. Richard E. Webb, “Some Autocatalytic Effects during Explosive Power Transients in Liquid Metal Cooled, Fast Breeder Nuclear Power Reactors (LMFBRs)”
(PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971).
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University of Wisconsin Press, 1981. The same material, under the title On the History of the Evolution of Light Water Reactor Safety in the United States, appears on the
internet at fissilematerials.org/library/OkrentReactorSafety.pdf.
4. Southwest Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor. Quarterly Plant Operations Report
No. 6, August 1–October 31, 1970.
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A Picture is Worth a
Thousand Words

Circle (added by authors)
designates evidence of positive
reactivity (FRED) strength
overriding negative Doppler
reactivity.

The graph shows the reactor power during a 0.55-second period
for the prompt-critical transient test with the highest-magnitude
positive reaction insertion (FRED) conducted during the SEFOR
program. The time periods for the reactivity insertion, the
Doppler negative reactivity response, and the automatic (delayed)
SCRAM at 0.35 second quantitatively appear to address the
principal questions raised by Dr. Webb in his testimony to the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
The FRED Insertion began at 0 seconds and ended at 0.1 second.
(text added by authors)
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Conclusions

The “picture” (graph) shown in chapter 7 is remarkable. The measured reactor power rose from its starting value at the beginning of
the test of 2 megawatts, as a result of the FRED reactivity insertion, to
approximately 9,000 megawatts, before it was turned around and began
decreasing as a result of the Doppler effect. Had the fuel been metallic
rather than the oxide form, and if the fuel fissile concentration had been
enriched to LMFBR levels, the Doppler effect would have been very
much less than it was in the SEFOR (oxide) core, and core reactivity
could have reached nuclear bomb damaging power. Instead, the Doppler effect stopped the acceleration of the power increase and caused it
to immediately begin decreasing, which it continued to do until the
reactor was SCRAMMED. The intentional SCRAM was purposely
delayed for an additional period of 0.25 seconds (past the 0.1-second
duration reactivity addition) in order to demonstrate the capability of
the Doppler effect to turn around the power excursion.
Quoting from the General Electric report SEFOR Core I Transients,1
“Eight super-prompt critical transients were performed in the Core 1
experimental program. The tests were initiated from nominal power levels of 2, 5, and 8 MW and resulted in peak power levels in excess of 9000
MW. . . . The small secondary power peak on the 1.25$ transient occurs as
additional positive reactivity insertion from the FRED overrides the initial
Doppler feedback. (emphasis added) The FRED rod reactivity insertion
terminated at 120 msec, thus limiting the magnitude of the second peak.”
This statement that the FRED positive reactivity insertion overrode the initial Doppler feedback appears to confirm Dr. Webb’s warnings to the AEC that the ability of the Doppler effect to prevent a
runaway power excursion was not unlimited. Indeed, it suggests that
for the SEFOR reactor design, the upper limit of the Doppler capability
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was exceeded, if only slightly, in the highest positive reactivity insertions conducted at SEFOR.
Quoting from the General Electric report SEFOR Experimental
Results and Applications to LMFBR’S,2 “The SEFOR results aptly demonstrate the effectiveness of the Doppler effect in providing inherent stability and safety to LMFMR’s. A particularly convincing demonstration was
provided by the super-prompt transient tests in which poison rods worth
up to 1.3$ in reactivity were ejected from the core from initial power levels up to 8 MW. In these tests the power quickly rose to ~10,000 MW as
a result of the rapid reactivity of ~15 cents/second; however, even before
all of the reactivity was inserted, the Doppler effect stopped the rapid power
rise and brought the reactor power to a level at which a delayed scram of
~350 msec could safely terminate the test. (emphasis added) These results
are in excellent agreement with predicted results based on pre-experimental analysis. . . . The good agreement between the SEFOR predicted and
experimental results for both static power measurements and transient
tests indicates that the Doppler theory as applied to LMFBR’s is sound.
The results of the various tests, therefore, may be used to provide a calibration of Doppler calculations for other reactor systems, taking care to
use consistent data and analysis techniques throughout the analysis of the
SEFOR results and the calculation of LMFBR power transients.” This
statement further confirms that the inherent safety provided by the Doppler
effect, however limited, is important because it allows time for the activation
of the SCRAM mechanism to stop the runaway.
In chapter 2, we made the following statement:
If, in Test No. 6, the increase in SEFOR’s power level caused by
the positive reactivity insertion had not hesitated as predicted
by the Doppler effect; if the reactivity insertion had been
accidentally maintained longer than the planned 0.1-second
duration; and if the SCRAM procedure had accidentally
failed—there was the real possibility that the power level
might have increased to levels with the potential to rupture the
containment.
A failure of the FRED system resulting in the poison rod suffering
delayed reentry to the core beyond the planned 0.1-second duration
was a risk factor that we cannot determine. In any case, we have no
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record that there was any such failure during any of the prompt-critical
transient tests that we are considering. The possibility that the power
increase would not hesitate as predicted was effectively made unlikely
by the nearly two-year-duration experimental study of the reactor to
determine, check, and double-check the calculation of the reactor core’s
Doppler Coefficient. The agreement between the measured and calculated performance of the reactor shown in the “picture” beginning this
final chapter speaks powerfully to the expertise and care provided by
the General Electric Company’s design and experimental evaluation
of the reactor before advancing to the conduct of the prompt-critical
transient tests. Indeed, the agreement shown between all of the promptcritical transient test measurements and the calculated values made
before the experiments were conducted is conclusive evidence that the
General Electric personnel conducting the tests had carefully examined
the reactor’s performance over a two-year period to verify and build
confidence in the value of the Doppler coefficient in the two different
SEFOR cores tested. It also appears to indicate that GE demonstrated the
maximum limits of the Doppler effect’s capability to turn around a potential runaway explosion by intentionally bumping up against the limiting
values they were confirming.
If the reactivity experiments had for any reason exceeded the reactor’s capability of turning the excursion around with the Doppler effect,
the last resort would have been the SCRAM system. Our study of the
extensive reports available to us indicated that the SCRAM system
was well conceived and designed for its purpose, and it was extensively
tested before the prompt-critical transient tests were undertaken. However, we learned that SEFOR suffered at least one partial-SCRAM failure
during its operation. That failure did not occur during a prompt-critical
transient test. We have not had the resources to calculate what the effect
would have been if there had been a serious SCRAM failure during the
prompt-critical transient tests such as the one depicted at the beginning
of the chapter.
We do know the total hours the reactor was critical during its
lifetime—3,895. If only one SCRAM failure had occurred during that
operation, the failure frequency would be one in 3,895 hours or two
per operating year. Such a frequency is not comforting considering the
possible consequences.
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If any of the accidental occurrences we have posited had occurred
during the test considered in this final chapter, it seems highly probable
that the SEFOR fuel temperature would have exceeded the melting
temperature. Even partial liquefaction of the core could cause rearrangements of the enriched plutonium fuel, potentially resulting in powerful
autocatalytic reactivity increases. If that had happened during the test
“pictured,” the chances that the resulting explosive overpressures would
have ensured that the primary containment would not fail seem slim to
us, as the SEFOR steel-reinforced concrete containment was designed
to withstand an explosion of just 200 pounds TNT equivalent.

Notes
1. GEAP-13837, SEFOR Core I Transients, Breeder Reactor Department, General
Electric Company, Sunnyvale, California, August 1972.
2. GEAP-13929, SEFOR Experimental Results and Applications to LMFBR’S,
Breeder Reactor Department, General Electric Company, Sunnyvale, California,
January 1973.

Postscript
Nuclear energy offers a Faustian bargain. It offers the World an inexhaustible source of energy. But in return, it demands a vigilance and
longevity of our social sciences to which we are quite unaccustomed.
Alvin M. Weinberg, 1915–2006

The SEFOR project was conceived in the middle of the twentieth century during the period when the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor
(LMFBR) was the AEC’s highest priority. But the LMFBR program
had strong opposition on economic grounds as well as concerns that
fast reactors had the potential to suffer nuclear explosions that could
not be economically contained to ensure against catastrophic releases
of radioactive products, including the fissile fuel itself, in the form of
aerosols to the environment. The purpose of the SEFOR program was
to demonstrate the Doppler effect in an LMFBR fueled with plutonium
oxide. That demonstration was successfully completed.
This book began to provide an accurate history of SEFOR. But
our research quickly led us to the knowledge that the final experiments
conducted at SEFOR for the Atomic Energy Commission prior to its
closure in early 1972 involved intentional insertion of reactivity into the
SEFOR core sufficient to change the nuclear reaction process from a
state in which the chain reaction fission rate was controlled by slow neutrons with average velocities of about 4,500 miles per hour to a chain
reaction state driven by “fast” neutrons with average velocities at least
a thousand times greater. Such fast-neutron fission can very quickly
drive the reaction at rates that are not controllable; this is nuclear fission explosion territory. But the AEC was confident that science had
predicted a nuclear reaction effect, herein called the Doppler effect, that
could result in a slowing of such “runaway” rates if the plutonium used
as fuel was of the oxide form, PuO2. As our country is now considering

123

124 | Postscript

the expanded use of fast-fission reactors for electricity generation, driven
powerfully by a motivation to provide an important solution to the
looming climate change threat—we added an additional purpose: the
provision of an accurate account of the risks that were taken in completing these experiments in the foothills of Arkansas’s Ozark Mountains.
Also, we hoped to provide some closure to the questions of the
residents in the neighborhood of the reactor. There is widespread fear
of anything radioactive, and misconceptions about what occurred at
SEFOR abound. At least for this group of people, though, we feel confident that this book provides information that will alleviate most of the
concerns we are aware of. To complete a clean-slate assessment of the
dangers that could potentially remain at the site, there are two principal
questions about the disposition of the hazardous materials that were
involved.

Sodium
In our review of the literature to determine where the sodium was disposed of shortly after the closure of SEFOR in early 1972, we found
indications that ninety-some-odd barrels of sodium had been transported to the Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site near Beatty,
Nevada. But our visit to the site failed to disclose any written records
of verification.
Just before this book went to press in 2020, we discovered on the
internet a report dated December 30, 2015, by the Nevada Department
of Public Safety entitled: Report on the October 18, 2015 Industrial Fire
Incident at the Closed State of Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site.1
Quoting from the Executive Summary of the report:
On October 18, 2015, an industrial fire incident occurred at the
closed State of Nevada low-level radioactive waste disposal site
located approximately 12 miles south of Beatty, Nye County,
Nevada on US Highway 95 near milepost NY 48. . . .
The State of Nevada acquired this site in 1961 to receive
low-level radioactive waste materials. These materials were
buried for disposal at this site from 1962 until the site was
closed in 1992. Materials were buried in numbered trenches
and covered by an earth fill. This incident occurred at the east
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end of Trench 14 near the east perimeter of the closed waste
disposal site.
Waste materials were buried in a variety of containers and
packaging, including steel drums, cardboard boxes and wood
crates. Over multiple decades of burial, the packaging materials have deteriorated and collapsed causing void spaces and
the resulting settlement of the fill and cover material in several
areas at the site.
Metallic sodium, packed in oil-filled steel drums, was
received from at least three sources for burial at the east end of
Trench 14 at this site. The sources included two (2) drums from
a US Bureau of Mines Research Center in Boulder City, closed
by that agency in the early 1970’s; twenty-two (22) drums
from Gulf-United Nuclear, Elmsford, New York, and ninetytwo (92) drums from GE Nuclear Energy Division-SEFOR,
Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Corrosion of the steel drums containing the metallic sodium
over time allowed the packing fluid to drain out, leaving the
metallic sodium exposed to the underground elements.
Approximately two weeks prior to the event, Desert Research
Institute (DRI) instrumentation at the site reported 1.29 inches
of rainfall on October 4 through 6, inclusive. On the day of
the incident DRI instruments recorded an additional 0.57 inch
of precipitation.
Although the original cover was designed and sloped to
drain rainwater, there was evidence to indicate that portions
of the cover were compromised due to settling and collapse
of underlying waste containers and resulting subsidence and
cracking of the cover, allowing the migration of rainwater into
these areas.
The heavy precipitation prior to and on the day of the event
saturated the earthen cover of the buried waste. Rainwater
seeping through the compromised earth cover reached the
metallic sodium causing an exothermic reaction between the
water and the metallic sodium.
The reaction produced a large amount of heat and generated quantities of hydrogen gas. The volume of gas produced
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caused the eruption of the ground, expelling dirt, buried and
corroded drums, and the products of the sodium-water reaction, primarily sodium hydroxide.
The heat generated by the sodium water reaction ignited
combustible metals at the immediate site, resulting in a fire.
The fire continued to burn into the evening and early
morning hours of the following day until all fuel had been
consumed. At that point the fire extinguished itself.
The incident resulted in no injuries to personnel, the effects
of the fire were contained to the immediate site, and there was
no release of radioactive materials.
So much for the sodium.

Plutonium
This is a bit more uncertain, but we can be confident that dangerous
amounts of plutonium do not remain near Strickler either. The brief
documents describing the decommissioning of the SEFOR site when it
was closed in 1972 indicated that the spent fuel from the reactor, which
would have almost certainly included the plutonium remaining on the
site, was transported by truck to Hanford.
We have identified only one other report that deals with the fate of
the SEFOR plutonium, entitled Processing of Non-PFP Plutonium Oxide
in Hanford Plants.2 Quoting from that report:
The SEFOR campaigns at PUREX in December 1966 and
April-May separated plutonium to produce plutonium nitrate
solutions were shipped off site for use in production of SEFOR
MOX fuel. There were some SEFOR returns of irradiated
fuel as waste to the 200 Area burial grounds. The bulk of the
SEFOR fuel reprocessing appears to have been conducted at
Savannah River between 7/84 and 12/84. The fuel may have
been sent to Savannah River rather than Hanford because the
Hanford PUREX plant shut down at about the same time the
SEFOR reactor was deactivated.
In short, aside from the account in the overview of Gerber,3 quoted
below, no written evidence for the processing of SEFOR MOX at Hanford was found in the technical literature.
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In the later years of REDOX operation (1963–1967), Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) and Shippingport (Pennsylvania) Reactor fuels were processed. PUREX also reprocessed
some PRTR fuel in 1972, as well as some Southeast Experimental Fast Oxide Reactor (SEFOR) fuel. Core dissolving of
these mixed oxide fuels involved the use of a highly corrosive
mixture of nitric acid and hydrofluoric acid, with the dissolver
solution then blended with recycled uranium to achieve criticality control.
Instead, it seems that the supporting documents that described
reprocessing campaigns to recover plutonium from relatively high burnup Hanford fuel for use in preparing SEFOR MOX were misinterpreted
to draw the conclusion that the reprocessing of irradiated SEFOR fuel
occurred at Hanford. The dates of the processing reports (1963–1967)
alone indicate that reprocessing of irradiated SEFOR fuel did not occur
at Hanford because SEFOR did not go critical until April 1969. In any
case, the spent fuel, including the plutonium, is most likely at Hanford
or Savannah River, or further used for other purposes—it is no longer
near Strickler.

Final Thoughts
While the residents near the SEFOR site can be confident, we believe,
that the site no longer harbors dangers, there is a very important legacy of the SEFOR super-prompt-critical experiments that must not be
forgotten.
Today, as the site resumes an essentially greenfield condition, there
is a strong push by the current federal government to adopt fast-reactor
generation of electrical power in order to alleviate the climate change
problem that is resulting because of the increasing carbon dioxide concentration in our atmosphere.
We believe the important legacy of SEFOR is the knowledge
described in this book about the conduct at the site of super-promptcritical experiments. We acknowledge the apparent extreme caring
effort that seems to have been insisted upon by the General Electric
Company in the successful and safely conducted experiments that
demonstrated the important physics of the Doppler effect for the safe
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operation of fast reactors fueled with mixed-oxide fuels containing plutonium and uranium.
But most importantly, we believe that there is a danger that the
Doppler effect demonstration completed at SEFOR could leave the
public with a false sense of security. While the Doppler effect is now
demonstrated to be real and accurately predictable, we believe that any
suggestion that it is any guarantee of safety regarding the possibility of
nuclear explosions is not correct.
Instead, we believe that from the beginning of the SEFOR effort,
there have existed real concerns by competent scientists and engineers
that there are unpredictable effects that could attend rearrangement of
the fissile material caused by accident or natural disasters that might
override the Doppler effect.
In our judgment, this leaves us, at least presently, in the situation
of being unable to confidently design a commercial fast reactor for
electricity generation that will contain a worst-case accident explosion,
ensuring against a catastrophic release of extremely dangerous radioactive materials to the environment. It seems to us that this predicament
is foretold in the admonition provided at the beginning of this postscript by Alvin Weinberg.

Notes
1. Report on the October 18, 2015 Industrial Fire Incident at the Closed State of
Nevada Low-Level Radioactive Waste Site, Nevada Department of Safety, Carson City,
Nevada, December 30, 2015.
2. S. A. Jones and C. H. Delegard, Processing of NON-PFP Plutonium Oxide in
Hanford Plants, PNNL-20246, WTP-RPT-211, March 2011.
3. M. S. Gerber, The Plutonium Production Story at the Hanford Site; Processes
and Facilities History, WHC-MR-0521, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland,
Washington, June 1996.
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